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Notes: VoIP Dont be a FOOL; The Law is Not DIY


Notes > VoIP These notes are not complete and there is no guarantee that they are accurate. They are presented simply as notes. Feel free to use them but as with all material on the Internet Telecom Project, you should consider them a beginning to your research and not an end.

VoIP Section Page
- Notes
- - VoIP Jurisdiction
- - VoIP Classification
- - VoIP Definition

Jurisdiction Federal / State

Federal versus State Jurisdiction
Interstate Analysis

Mixed / Impossible

GeoLocation

Supremacy Clause / Preemption

FCC
States
Preempted
Not Preempted

47 USC 230 Unfettering
Sec. 706

Commerce Clause
Opposition to Multiple Jurisdictions Regulation

Definitions / Descriptions
VoIP 
Caselaw
FCC
States
State - Not in Regulatory Proceding
Defined as Bypass
Various Designs
Free World Dialup 
Vonage
Classification Functional Approach 
Application of State Law
Facilities
Computer Inquiries: Basic v. Enhanced Services Dichotomy
Computer Inquires
Telecom / Information Service (Telecom Act)
Telecom Service / Info Service Mutually Exclusive
Steven's Report
Steven's Criteria
Classes of Providers 
Duck
Steven's Report Criteria Applied 
Computer to Computer
Phone to Phone
Phone to Phone Long Distance
Information Service Analysis
Telecom Service Analysis
Telecom
Layered Approach
Market Approach
Legacy Regulations on Nascent / New Network
Unfettered
Issues
Universal Service
Access Charges
911
Power / Emergencies
CALEA Wiretaps
Voluntary Calea
Consumer Protection
Access by Individuals with Disabilities
NANP
State Proceedings

Jurisdiction Fed/State

Federal versus State Split

16. In the absence of a specific statutory provision regarding jurisdiction over services like DigitalVoice, we begin with section 2 of the Act.50 In 1934, Congress set up a dual regulatory regime for communications services.51 In section 2(a) of the Act, Congress has given the Commission exclusive jurisdiction over “all interstate and foreign communication” and “all persons engaged . . . in such communication.”52 Section 2(b) of the Act reserves to the states jurisdiction “with respect to intrastate communication service . . . of any carrier.”53

50See Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 131 F.3d 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

51See generally 47 U.S.C. § 152.

5247 U.S.C. § 152(a). Congress defined “interstate communication” as “communication or transmission . . . from any State, Territory, or possession of the United States. . . to any other State, Territory, or possession of the United States . . . but shall not . . . include wire or radio communication between points in the same State . . . through any place outside thereof, if such communication is regulated by a State commission.” 47 U.S.C. § 153(22).

5347 U.S.C. § 152(b). “[I]ntrastate communications” is not separately defined in the Act except to the extent it is described in the definition of “interstate communication” as a “wire or radio communication between points in the same State.” 47 U.S.C. § 153(22) (emphasis added). We note that section 2(b) reserves to the states only matters connected with “carriers,” which means “common carriers” or “telecommunications carriers” under sections 3(10) and 3(44) of the Act. 47 U.S.C. § 153(10), (44). Here, we do not determine whether Vonage is a “carrier”; however, our analysis with respect to section 2(b) assumes that it is. This assumption for purposes of this Order, however, in no way prejudges how the Commission may ultimately classify DigitalVoice.

Vonage Holdings Corporation Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning an Order of the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, WC Docket No. 03-211, Memorandum Opinion and Order (FCC Nov. 12, 2004 )

Interstate Analysis

Note: This analysis is relevant as to the jurisdiction of telecom services. If the service is an information service, then the Interstate analysis is not necessary; Information services fall under federal jurisdiction and would not fall under the jurisdiction of a state PUC.

17. In applying section 2 to specific services and facilities, the Commission has traditionally applied its so-called “end-to-end analysis” based on the physical end points of the communication.54 Under this analysis, the Commission considers the “continuous path of communications,” beginning with the end point at the inception of a communication to the end point at its completion, and has rejected attempts to divide communications at any intermediate points.55 Using an end-to-end approach, when the end points of a carrier’s service are within the boundaries of a single state the service is deemed a purely intrastate service, subject to state jurisdiction for determining appropriate regulations to govern such service.56 When a service’s end points are in different states or between a state and a point outside the United States , the service is deemed a purely interstate service subject to the Commission’s exclusive jurisdiction.57 Services that are capable of communications both between intrastate end points and between interstate end points are deemed to be “mixed-use” or “jurisdictionally mixed” services.58 Mixed-use services are generally subject to dual federal/state jurisdiction, except where it is impossible or impractical to separate the service’s intrastate from interstate components and the state regulation of the intrastate component interferes with valid federal rules or policies.59 In such circumstances, the Commission may exercise its authority to preempt inconsistent state regulations that thwart federal objectives, treating jurisdictionally mixed services as interstate with respect to the preempted regulations.60

54See, e.g.,Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 206 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see infra para. 24 (addressing difficulties with an end-to-end approach for services involving the Internet).

55See, e.g.,Pulver, 19 FCC Rcd at 3320-21, para. 21.

56See 47 U.S.C. § 152(b)(1).

57 See 47 U.S.C. § 153(22).

58 See, e.g., MTS and WATS Market Structure Amendment of Part 67 of the Commission’s Rules and Establishment of a Joint Board , CC Docket Nos. 78-72, 80-286, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration and Order Inviting Comments , 1 FCC Rcd 1287 (1987); Petition for Emergency Relief and Declaratory Ruling Filed by the BellSouth Corporation, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 7 FCC Rcd 1619, 1620, para. 7 (1992) (BellSouth MemoryCall); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 153 F.3d 523, 543 (8th Cir. 1998).

59SeeLouisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368 (1986) (finding a basis for Commission preemption where compliance with both federal and state law is in effect physically impossible) (citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963)); BellSouth MemoryCall, 7 FCC Rcd at 1622-23, paras. 18-19.

60Indeed, the Eighth Circuit has recently noted the Commission’s authority to preempt in the area of jurisdictionally mixed special access services. SeeQwest Corp. v. Minnesota Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 380 F.3d 367, 374 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding that, with respect to special access services, the Commission “certainly has the wherewithal to preempt state regulation in this area if it so desires”) (emphasis added).

Vonage Holdings Corporation Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning an Order of the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, WC Docket No. 03-211, Memorandum Opinion and Order (FCC Nov. 12, 2004)

Mixed / Impossible

Third, Vonage claims that the impossibility doctrine and the FCC's mixed use rule preempt state regulation of VoIP services such as those provided by Vonage. The impossibility doctrine holds that state jurisdiction over intrastate communications is preserved unless it is impossible to separate the interstate and intrastate aspects of a service, and state regulation would negate the FCC’s lawful exercise of its authority over interstate communications.28 The FCC has the burden of showing that its rules preempt only state rules that actually interfere with its goals.29 It has made no such declaration. Moreover, Vonage's claim that it is technically impossible to separate intrastate and interstate regulation of its services is incorrect. The company's "Unlimited Local Plan"30 allows customers unlimited local and regional calling and up to 500 minutes of long distance calls. By implementing this plan, the company has shown that it can distinguish local calls from long distance calls. Consequently, it is not impossible to separate intrastate and interstate calls.
    The FCC's mixed use rule also does not apply to Vonage. The FCC established the mixed use rule as a way to establish the appropriate jurisdiction over special access lines where it was impractical to determine the jurisdictional status of the traffic.31 It was not used by the FCC for any purpose other than allocating special access jurisdiction32 and, therefore, is inapposite to Vonage's service.
-- Complaint of Frontier Telephone of Rochester, Inc. Against Vonage Holdings Corporation Concerning Provision of Local Exchange and InterExchange Telephone Service in New York State in Violation of the Public Service Law, CASE 03-C-1285, Order Establishing Balanced Regulatory Framework for Vonage Holding Corporation, p. 11-15 (May 21, 2004)

GeoLocation

VoIP communications also differ from traditional circuit-switched telephone communications in another significant way. The end-to-end geographic locations of traditional landline-to-landline telephone communications are readily known, so it is easy to determine whether a particular phone call is intrastate or interstate in nature. Conversely, VoIP-to-VoIP communications originate and terminate at IP addresses which exist in cyberspace, but are tied to no identifiable geographic location. For example, a VoIP customer residing in Minnesota but visiting New York could connect a laptop computer to a broadband internet connection and communicate with a nextdoor neighbor via computer back in Minnesota, while the next day the same "caller" could be in Los Angeles and talk to the same friend who now happens to be in Los Angeles as well. The Internet would recognize both communications as taking place between the same two IP addresses, but when considering the geographic locations of the caller and recipient, the first call would be interstate while the second intrastate in nature.

Similarly, in VoIP-to-landline or landline-to-VoIP communications, known as "interconnected VoIP service,"2 the geographic location of the landline part of the call can be determined, but the geographic location of the VoIP part of the call could be anywhere in the universe the VoIP customer obtains broadband access to the Internet, not necessarily confined to the geographic location associated with the customer's billing address or assigned telephone number. Furthermore, using the North American Numbering Plan (NANP) (i.e., the system of using a three-digit area code followed by a seven-digit number) or a VoIP customer's billing address as "proxies" for the originating or terminating points of interconnected VoIP communications causes some interstate calls to appear to be intrastate in nature and vice versa. In the example used above, if we assume both the caller and recipient had Minnesota billing addresses and NANP numbers with Minnesota area codes, both communications would appear to be intrastate Minnesota calls if the billing addresses or NANP numbers were used as proxies for the originating and terminating points of the communications, even though the first was an interstate call between New York and Minnesota and the second an intrastate California call.

The use of such proxies as substitutes for the actual originating and terminating points of VoIP communications is further complicated by the fact VoIP customers can choose NANP numbers with area codes different from those associated with their billing addresses. Again referring to the example used above, assume the VoIP customer residing in Minnesota chose a NANP number with an Arizona area code. In such a case, the interstate communication between New York and Minnesota would appear to be a Minnesota intrastate call if the customer's billing address were used as a proxy for the originating point, but appear to be an interstate call between Arizona and Minnesota if the NANP number were used as a proxy for the originating point.

- Minnesota PUC v. FCC, Case No 05-1069 Sec. 1 (8th Cir Mar. 2007)


Because Minnesota inextricably links pre-approval of a 911 plan to becoming certificated to offer service in the state, the application of its 911 requirements operates as an entry regulation. Vonage explains that there is no practicable way for it to comply with this requirement: it cannot today identify with sufficient accuracy the geographic location of a caller, and it has not obtained access in all cases to incumbent LEC E911 trunks that carry calls to specialized operators at public safety answering points (PSAPs).146

146 See Vonage Petition at 8-9, 24-25.

Vonage Holdings Corporation Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning an Order of the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, WC Docket No. 03-211, Memorandum Opinion and Order, para. 42 (FCC Nov. 12, 2004)


23. In this section, we examine whether there is any plausible approach to separating DigitalVoice into interstate and intrastate components for purposes of enabling dual federal and state regulations to coexist without “negating” federal policy and rules.86 We find none. Without a practical means to separate the service, the Minnesota Vonage Order unavoidably reaches the interstate components of the DigitalVoice service that are subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction. Vonage has no means of directly or indirectly identifying the geographic location of a DigitalVoice subscriber. Even, however, if this information were reliably obtainable, Vonage’s service is far too multifaceted for simple identification of the user’s location to indicate jurisdiction. Moreover, the significant costs and operational complexities associated with modifying or procuring systems to track, record and process geographic location information as a necessary aspect of the service would substantially reduce the benefits of using the Internet to provide the service, and potentially inhibit its deployment and continued availability to consumers.87

24. DigitalVoice harnesses the power of the Internet to enable its users to establish a virtual presence in multiple locations simultaneously, to be reachable anywhere they may find a broadband connection, and to manage their communications needs from any broadband connection. The Internet’s inherently global and open architecture obviates the need for any correlation between Vonage’s DigitalVoice service and its end users’ geographic locations. As we noted above, however, the Commission has historically applied the geographic “end-to-end” analysis to distinguish interstate from intrastate communications.88 As networks have changed and the services provided over them have evolved, the Commission has increasingly acknowledged the difficulty of using an end-to-end analysis when the services at issue involve the Internet. 89 DigitalVoice shares many of the same characteristics as these other services involving the Internet, thus making jurisdictional determinations about particular DigitalVoice communications based on an end-point approach difficult, if not impossible. 90

25. In fact, the geographic location of the end user at any particular time is only one clue to a jurisdictional finding under the end-to-end analysis. The geographic location of the “termination” of the communication is the other clue; yet this is similarly difficult or impossible to pinpoint. This “impossibility” results from the inherent capability of IP-based services to enable subscribers to utilize multiple service features that access different websites or IP addresses during the same communication session and to perform different types of communications simultaneously, none of which the provider has a means to separately track or record.91 For example, a DigitalVoice user checking voicemail or reconfiguring service options would be communicating with a Vonage server. A user forwarding a voicemail via e-mail to a colleague using an Internet-based e-mail service would be “communicating” with a different Internet server or user. An incoming call to a user invoking forwarding features could “terminate” anywhere the DigitalVoice user has programmed. A communication from a DigitalVoice user to a similar IP-enabled provider’s user would “terminate” to a geographic location unknown either to Vonage or to the other provider. 92 These functionalities in all their combinations form an integrated communications service designed to overcome geography, not track it. Indeed, it is the total lack of dependence on any geographically defined location that most distinguishes DigitalVoice from other services whose federal or state jurisdiction is determined based on the geographic end points of the communications.93 Consequently, Vonage has no service-driven reason to know users’ locations, 94 and Vonage asserts it presently has no way to know. 95 Furthermore, to require Vonage to attempt to incorporate geographic “end-point” identification capabilities into its service solely to facilitate the use of an end-to-end approach would serve no legitimate policy purpose. 96 Rather than encouraging and promoting the development of innovative, competitive advanced service offerings, 97 we would be taking the opposite course, molding this new service into the same old familiar shape.

26. In the absence of a capability to identify directly DigitalVoice communications that originate and terminate within the boundaries of Minnesota, we still consider whether some method exists to identify such communications indirectly, such that Minnesota’s regulations could nonetheless apply to only that “intrastate” usage such as voice calls between persons located in the same state.98 For example, assume Minnesota were to use DigitalVoice subscribers’ NPA/NXXs as a proxy for those subscribers’ geographic locations when making or receiving calls. If a subscriber’s NPA/NXX were associated with Minnesota under the NANP, Minnesota ’s telephone company regulations would attach to every DigitalVoice communication that occurred between that subscriber and any other party having a Minnesota NPA/NXX. But because subscribers residing anywhere could obtain a Minnesota NPA/NXX, a subscriber may never be present in Minnesota when communicating with another party that is, yet Minnesota would treat those calls as subject to its jurisdiction.99

27. Similarly, if a Minnesota NPA/NXX subscriber residing in Minnesota used its service outside the state to call someone in Minnesota , that call would appear to be an intrastate call when it is actually interstate. Some commenters suggest that because Vonage markets DigitalVoice to provide “local” and “long distance” calls it surely has an ability to distinguish between intrastate and interstate calls.100 These commenters fail to recognize that these calls are not “local” and “long distance” in the sense that they are for traditional wireline telephone services. Rather, like we have seen with the proxy example above, Vonage describes these calling capabilities for convenience in terms that its subscribers understand. A DigitalVoice call that would be deemed “local,” for example, is actually a call between two NPA/NXXs associated with particular rate centers in a particular state, yet when the actual communication occurs one or both parties can be located outside those rate centers, outside the state, or even on opposite ends of the world.

28. We further consider whether Minnesota could assert jurisdiction over DigitalVoice communications based on whether the subscriber’s billing address or address of residence are in Minnesota . This too fails. When a subscriber with a Minnesota billing address or address of residence uses DigitalVoice from any location outside the state to call a party located in Minnesota , Minnesota would treat that communication as “intrastate” based on the address proxy for that subscriber’s location, yet in actuality it would be an interstate call.101

29. These proxies are very poor fits, yet even their implementation would impose substantial costs retrofitting DigitalVoice into a traditional voice service model for the sole purpose of making it easier to apply traditional voice regulations to only a small aspect of Vonage’s integrated service.102 Forcing such changes to this service would greatly diminish the advantages of the Internet's ubiquitous and open nature that inspire the offering of services such as DigitalVoice in the first instance. 103 Indeed, Vonage would have to change multiple aspects of its service operations that are not nor were ever designed to incorporate geographic considerations, including modifications to systems that track and identify subscribers’ communications activity and facilitate billing; the development of new rate and service structures; and sales and marketing efforts, 104 just for regulatory purposes. 105 The Commission has previously recognized the significant efforts and inefficiency to attempt to separate out an intrastate component of other services for certain regulatory purposes where the provider, like Vonage here, had no service-driven reason to incorporate such capability into its operations. 106 We have declined to require such separation in those circumstances, treating the services at issue as jurisdictionally interstate for the particular regulatory purpose at issue and preempting state regulation where necessary. 107 For example, in preempting a state regulation specifying default per line blocking of a customer’s “Caller ID” for intrastate calls based on “impossibility,” the Commission found that “we need not demonstrate absolute future impossibility to justify federal preemption here. We need only show that interstate and intrastate aspects of a regulated service or facility are inseverable as a practical matter in light of prevailing technological and economic conditions.” 108

30. In the case of DigitalVoice, Vonage could not even avoid violating Minnesota ’s order by trying not to provide intrastate communications in that state. 109 For the same reasons that Vonage cannot identify a communication that occurs within the boundaries of a single state, it cannot prevent its users from making such calls by attempting to block any calls between people in Minnesota . 110 Indeed, Vonage could not avoid similar “intrastate” regulations if imposed by any of the other more than 50 separate jurisdictions. Due to the intrinsic ubiquity of the Internet, nothing short of Vonage ceasing to offer its service entirely could guarantee that any subscriber would not engage in some communications where a state may deem that communication to be “intrastate” thereby subjecting Vonage to its economic regulations absent preemption.

31. There is, quite simply, no practical way to sever DigitalVoice into interstate and intrastate communications that enables the Minnesota Vonage Order to apply only to intrastate calling functionalities without also reaching the interstate aspects of DigitalVoice, nor is there any way for Vonage to choose to avoid violating that order if it continues to offer DigitalVoice anywhere in the world. 111 Thus, to whatever extent, if any, DigitalVoice includes an intrastate component, because of the impossibility of separating out such a component, we must preempt the Minnesota Vonage Order because it outright conflicts with federal rules and policies governing interstate DigitalVoice communications.

32. Indeed, the practical inseverability of other types of IP-enabled services having basic characteristics similar to DigitalVoice would likewise preclude state regulation to the same extent as described herein. Specifically, these basic characteristics include: a requirement for a broadband connection from the user’s location ; a need for IP-compatible CPE; and a service offering that includes a suite of integrated capabilities and features, able to be invoked sequentially or simultaneously, that allows customers to manage personal communications dynamically, including enabling them to originate and receive voice communications and access other features and capabilities, even video.112 In particular, the provision of tightly integrated communications capabilities greatly complicates the isolation of intrastate communication and counsels against patchwork regulation. Accordingly, to the extent other entities, such as cable companies, provide VoIP services,113 we would preempt state regulation to an extent comparable to what we have done in this Order.

86 SeeLouisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. at 368 (holding that the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitution provides Congress with the power to preempt state law and explaining the numerous bases for preemption); see also Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Maryland v. FCC, 909 F.2d at 1515 (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. FCC , 880 F.2d at 429-31); Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs , 880 F.2d at 425 (“ We conclude that the Commission may only preempt state regulation over intrastate wire communication to the degree necessary to keep such regulation from negating the Commission's exercise of its lawful authority over interstate communication service.” ).

87See Letter from William B. Wilhelm, Jr. and Ronald W. Del Sesto, Jr., Counsel for Vonage, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 03-211, at 5 (filed Oct. 19, 2004) (Vonage Oct. 19 Ex Parte Letter)

88See supra para. 17.

89For example, in attempting to apply an end-to-end analysis to an incumbent LEC’s digital subscriber line (DSL) telecommunications service to determine whether federal or state tariffing requirements should attach, the Commission noted that “an Internet communication does not necessarily have a point of ‘termination’ in the traditional sense.” GTE ADSL Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 22478-79, para. 22. In a later proceeding involving the provision of Telecommunications Relay Service over the Internet, the Commission similarly noted the difficulty in pinpointing the origination of an IP-Relay call arising over the Internet because Internet addresses do not have geographic correlates equivalent to the PSTN’s automatic number identifiers, which are tied to geographic locations, and thus, there is no automatic way to determine whether any call is intrastate or interstate. See Provision of Improved Telecommunications Relay Services and Speech-to-Speech Services for Individuals with Hearing and Speech Disabilities, CC Docket No. 98-67, Declaratory Ruling and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 FCC 7779, 7784, para. 15 (2002) (IP-Relay Second FNPRM). Significantly, as recently as June, the Commission issued yet another Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in this proceeding, recognizing the continued technological inability to identify the location of an IP-Relay user. See Telecommunications Relay Services and Speech-to-Speech Services for Individuals with Hearing and Speech Disabilities, CC Docket Nos. 90-571, 98-67; CG Docket No. 03-123, Report and Order; Order on Reconsideration; Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 19 FCC Rcd 12475, 12561, para. 221 (2004) (2004 IP-Relay FNPRM). In Pulver, the Commission concluded that the concept of “end points” and an end-to-end analysis were not relevant to Pulver’s Internet-based VoIP information service. See Pulver, 19 FCC Rcd at 3316-23, paras. 15-25.

90See Vonage Petition at 5, 28.

91See, e.g., Vonage Oct. 19 Ex Parte Letter at 4-5 (explaining that in addition to having no way to determine a geographic origination point, determining a geographic destination is not possible either); see also Letter from Glenn T. Reynolds, BellSouth Corp., to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket Nos. 04-36; 03-211, Attach. at 6-12 (filed Oct.26, 2004) (BellSouth Oct. 26 Ex Parte Letter) (explaining the multitude of simultaneous capabilities during a single communication that makes a point of destination unknown); Letter from Howard Symons, Counsel for NTCA, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket Nos. 03-211, 04-36 Attach. at 2-3 (filed Oct.28, 2004) (NCTA Oct. 28 Ex Parte Letter) (describing the core integrated features that “cable VoIP” provides to subscribers); Letter from Adam D. Krinsky, Counsel for CTIA, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket Nos. 04-36; 03-211, (filed Oct.25, 2004) (CTIA Oct. 25 Ex Parte Letter) (explaining that IP-enabled services do not have definable termination points).

92See Vonage Oct. 19 Ex Parte Letter at 4-5.

93We note that these integrated capabilities and features are not unique to DigitalVoice, but are inherent features of most, if not all, IP-based services having basic characteristics found in DigitalVoice, including those offered or planned by facilities-based providers. See infra note 113 for a brief summary of these basic characteristics; see also, e.g., Letter from Kathleen Grillo, Verizon, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 03-211 at 1-3 (filed Nov. 1, 2004) (Verizon Nov. 1 Ex Parte Letter) (describing Verizon’s VoiceWing service); Letter from Cronan O’Connell, Qwest, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 03-211 (filed Sept. 27, 2004) (Qwest Sept. 27 Ex Parte Letter) (describing Qwest’s VoIP architecture and service); Letter from Judy Sello, AT&T, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket No. 03-211 at 1-4, (filed Oct. 21, 2004) (AT&T Oct 21 Ex Parte Letter) (describing AT&T’s CallVantage service); Letter from James K. Smith, Executive Director – Federal Regulatory, SBC, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket Nos. 03-211, 04-29, 04-36, Attach. at 4-11 (filed Oct. 8, 2004) (SBC Oct. 8 Ex Parte Letter) (describing SBC’s VoIP architecture and service);Letter from Glenn T. Reynolds, Vice President – Federal Regulatory, BellSouth, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket Nos. 03-211, 04-36, Attach. at 6-12 (filed Oct. 26, 2004) (BellSouth Oct. 26 Ex Parte Letter) (describing BellSouth’s VoIP architecture and service); Letter from Glenn T. Reynolds, Vice President – Federal Regulatory, BellSouth, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket Nos. 03-211, 04-36, Attach. at 4 (filed Oct. 7, 2004) (BellSouth Oct. 7 Ex Parte Letter) (describing BellSouth’s VoIP architecture and service);Letter from Howard J. Symons, Counsel for National Cable & Telecommunications Association (NCTA), to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket Nos. 03-211, 04-36, Attach. at 3-5 (filed Oct. 28, 2004) (NCTA Oct. 28 Ex Parte Letter) (describing cable VoIP architecture).

94 See American Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“Internet protocols were designed to ignore rather than document geographic location.”).

95We acknowledge that certain geolocation products may be capable of identifying, to some degree, the geographic location of a Vonage user in the future, see, e.g., Sprint Reply at 7, but the record does not reflect that such information is readily obtainable at this time. See, e.g., 8x8 Comments at 14-15. Should Vonage decide in the future to incorporate geolocation capabilities into its service to facilitate additional features that may be dependent on reliable location determining capabilities, e.g., E911-type features or law enforcement surveillance capabilities, this would not alter the fact that the service enables the user’s location to change continually. See Vonage Oct. 19 Ex Parte Letter at 3-6 (explaining how user location information for emergency services purposes would have no relevance to an end to end jurisdictional analysis for DigitalVoice).

96See Pulver, 19 FCC Rcd at 3320-21, para. 21 (“Attempting to require Pulver to locate its members for the purpose of adhering to a regulatory analysis that served another network would be forcing changes on this service for the sake of regulation itself, rather than for any particular policy purpose.”).

97See, e.g., Letter from Staci L. Pies, The VON Coalition, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket No. 01‑92; WC Docket Nos. 02-361, 03-211, 03-266, 04-36, Attach. at 1 (filed Aug. 19, 2004) (VON Coalition Aug. 19 Ex Parte Letter).

98Where the Commission has found it difficult to apply an end-to-end approach for jurisdictional purposes, it has proposed or adopted proxy or allocation mechanisms to approximate an end-to-end result. See, e.g., GTE ADSL Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 22479, para. 23 (applying the 10% rule for determining interstate jurisdiction for federal tariffing purposes); IP-Relay Second FNPRM, 17 FCC Rcd at 7784, para. 15 (proposing either an allocator to approximate the mix of interstate/intrastate traffic or a user self-identification mechanism to identify its end-point location); 2004 IP-Relay FNPRM, 19 FCC Rcd at 12561-64, paras. 221-30 (proposing either user-registration or allocation mechanisms to determine interstate or intrastate use; asking whether, in the alternative, all IP-Relay calls should simply be deemed interstate). We find a ‘percentage’ proxy to be unhelpful in addressing the conflict between the federal and state regulatory regimes (in particular, the tariffing and certification requirements) at issue in this proceeding, because using such a proxy would not avoid frustration of the Commission’s policy objectives discussed above. See supra section III.A.3. But see, e.g., MTA Comments at 10.

99In this example, if we further assume Minnesota requires entry certification for Vonage, but has an entry condition that Vonage cannot meet, Vonage could be subject to state sanctions for “operating” in the state without authority to the extent any of its customers nationwide obtain Minnesota NPA/NXXs and use the service to communicate with someone in Minnesota even though that subscriber never had a physical presence in Minnesota.

100See, e.g., NASUCA Reply at 15.

101In this example, if we further assume Minnesota has imposed a specific rate requirement on DigitalVoice’s intrastate communications, this rate requirement would apply to all DigitalVoice communications made by that subscriber to someone in Minnesota even though many of those communications are interstate under the Act.

102See Pulver, 19 FCC Rcd at 3321-23, paras. 22, 24 (finding it similarly impossible to separate Pulver’s VoIP service).

103See, e.g., Vonage Oct. 19 Ex Parte Letter at 6.

104In reviewing a challenge to a Commission requirement for BOC joint CPE/service marketing because it would “surely ‘affect’ charges for” and regulate “intrastate communications services,” and preemption of inconsistent state regulation, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the Commission stating that “[e]ven if [it] were a purely intrastate service, the FCC might well have authority to preemptive regulate its marketing if – as would appear here – it was typically sold in a package with interstate services. Marketing realities might themselves create inseparability.” Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 883 F.2d 104, 112-13 & n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (referencing Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 476 U.S. 355).

105Seegenerally Vonage Oct. 19 Ex Parte Letter.

106See MTS and WATS Market Structure, Amendment of Part 36 of the Commission’s Rules and Establishment of a Joint Board, CC Docket Nos. 78-72, 80-286, Decision and Order, 4 FCC Rcd 5660, n.7 (1989) (MTS/WATS Market Structure Separations Order) (finding that “mixed use” special access lines carrying more than a de minimis amount of interstate traffic to private line systems are subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction for jurisdictional separations purposes because separating interstate from intrastate traffic on many such lines could not be measured without “significant additional administrative efforts”); see alsoQwest Corp. v. Minnesota Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 380 F.3d 367, 374 (finding that the Commission’s preemptive intent concerning the de minimis rule relates to cost allocation for ratemaking purposes rather than plenary regulatory authority but stating that the Commission “certainly has the wherewithal to preempt state regulation in this area if it so desires”) (emphasis added); BellSouth MemoryCall, 7 FCC Rcd at 1620, para. 7 (preempting order of a state commission imposing regulatory conditions on the offering of the intrastate portion of a jurisdictionally mixed service because of the expense, operational, and technical difficulties associated with identifying the intrastate portion and the effect it would likely have on the provider’s continued offering of the interstate portion).

107See, e.g ., MTS/WATS Market Structure Separations Order, 4 FCC Rcd 5660, n.7; BellSouth MemoryCall, 7 FCC Rcd at 1620, para. 7

108 See Rules and Policies Regarding Calling Number Identification Service – Caller ID, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, Second Report and Order and Third Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 10 FCC Rcd 11700, 11727-28, para. 77 (1995) (citing California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 1994)), aff’d, California v. FCC, 75 F.3d 1350 (9th Cir. 1996). Th e Ninth Circuit affirmed the Commission’s preemption in this case, finding it to fit within the impossibility exception. SeeCalifornia v. FCC, 75 F.3d at 1360. Indeed, when possible, this Commission prefers that economic and market considerations drive the development of technology, rather than regulatory requirements. See,e.g.,Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers; Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, Order on Reconsideration, CC Docket Nos. 01-338, 96-98, 98-147, FCC 04-248, para. 19 (rel. Oct. 18, 2004) (concluding that decision regarding “which broadband technologies to deploy is best left to . . . the market . . . . We decline to second-guess or skew those technology choices . . . .”).

109See Vonage Petition at v, 31; see alsoAmerican Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 171 (explaining that no aspect of the Internet can fairly be closed off to users from any state).

110See Vonage Petition at v, 31.

111See Public Util. Comm’n of Texas v. FCC , 886 F.2d 1325 (citing Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 375, the court upheld preemption of a Texas Public Utility Commission order prohibiting an incumbent LEC from providing interconnection to the PSTN to a customer where the FCC cannot “separate the interstate and the intrastate components of [its] asserted regulation.”); Public Serv. Comm’n of Maryland v. FCC, 909 F.2d at 1515 (citing Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 375, to uphold Commission’s preemption of a state commission’s prescribed rates for LEC charges to interexchange carriers for customer disconnections based on the impossibility exception).

112See, e.g., SBC Oct. 8 Ex Parte Letter, Attach. at 4-11;BellSouth Oct. 26 Ex Parte Letter, Attach. at 6-12; BellSouth Oct. 7 Ex Parte Letter, Attach. at 4.

113See, e.g., Letter from J.G. Harrington, Counsel for Cox Communications, Inc., to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket Nos. 03-211, 04-36, at 1-2 (filed Oct. 27, 2004) (“This network design also permits providers to offer a single, integrated service that includes both local and long distance calling and a host of other features that can be supported from national or regional data centers and accessed by users across state lines. . . . In addition to call setup, these functions include generation of call announcements, record-keeping, CALEA, voice mail and other features such as *67, conferencing and call waiting. ... [T]here are no facilities at the local level of a managed voice over IP network that can perform these functions.”); Letter from Henk Brands, Counsel for Time Warner Inc., to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket Nos. 03-211, 04-36, at 2, 9 (filed Oct. 29, 2004) (Time Warner Oct. 29 Ex Parte Letter) (“[T]he Commission should take a broader approach by recognizing additional characteristics of IP-based voice services and extend the benefits of preemption to all VoIP providers. . . . [B]y its nature, VoIP is provided on a multistate basis, making different state regulatory requirements particularly debilitating.”); NCTA Oct. 28 Ex Parte Letter, Attach. at 1 (“ Cable VoIP offers consumers an integrated package of voice and enhanced features that are unavailable from traditional circuit-switched service. . . . A cable company may have no idea whether a customer is accessing these features from home or from a remote location. The integral nature of these features and functions renders cable VoIP service an interstate offering subject to exclusive FCC jurisdiction. . . . Not every cable VoIP service has the same mix of features and functionalities . . . , but all cable VoIP offers the types of enhancements that render it an interstate service. Similarly, while the network architecture of each cable VoIP system will not be identical, they share the same centralized network design that impart an interstate nature.”); Letter from Daniel L. Brenner, Senior Vice President, Law & Regulatory Policy, NCTA, to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, WC Docket Nos. 03-211, 04-36, Attach. at 1 (filed Oct. 27, 2004) (“Functions integral to every call, such as CALEA compliance, voicemail recording, storage, and retrieval, call record-keeping, 3-way calling and other functions are provided from these central facilities. These facilities are often located in a state different from the origin of the call.”).


Vonage Holdings Corporation Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning an Order of the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, WC Docket No. 03-211, Memorandum Opinion and Order, para. 4(FCC Nov. 12, 2004)

Conclusion: Application, No Physical Network: Interstate

18. Thus, our threshold determination must be whether DigitalVoice is purely intrastate (subject only to state jurisdiction) or jurisdictionally mixed (subject also to federal jurisdiction). The nature of DigitalVoice precludes any suggestion that the service could be characterized as a purely intrastate service.61 As Vonage has indicated, it has over 275,000 subscribers located throughout the United States, each with the ability to communicate with anyone in the world from anywhere in the world.62 While DigitalVoice clearly enables intrastate communications, it also enables interstate communications. It is therefore a jurisdictionally mixed service,63 and this Commission has exclusive jurisdiction under the Act to determine the policies and rules, if any, that govern the interstate aspect of DigitalVoice service.64

61We need not address in this Order the case of purely intrastate service, which is not the service we have before us in this petition.

62See Vonage Oct. 1 Ex Parte Letter at 2 (explaining that its subscribers have billing addresses in each of the 50 states, the District of Columbia and throughout Canada, that its subscribers regularly use the service from countries outside North America, including “Argentina, Australia . . . and the United Kingdom,” and that customers have used the service “from virtually every inhabitable continent in the world”).

63We analyze DigitalVoice for purposes of preemption as a jurisdictionally mixed service due to its recognized capability to enable communications to occur not only between different states but within a particular state. This notwithstanding, it is possible that the Commission may find, in the context of the IP-Enabled Services Proceeding, that this type of service simply has no intrastate component.

64SeeLouisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 476 U.S. at 360 (explaining how the Act would seem to divide the world of domestic telephone service into two hemispheres – one comprised of interstate service, over which the Commission has “plenary authority”); see also Ivy Broad. Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 391 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1968) (“The Supreme Court has held that the establishment of this broad scheme for the regulation of interstate service by communications carriers indicates an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field to the exclusion of state law.”).

Vonage Holdings Corporation Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning an Order of the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, WC Docket No. 03-211, Memorandum Opinion and Order (FCC Nov. 12, 2004 )

Supremacy Clause / Preemption

19. Although the Communications Act establishes dual federal-state authority to regulate certain communications services, courts routinely recognize that there may be circumstances where state regulation would necessarily conflict with the Commission’s valid exercise of authority.65 Where separating a service into interstate and intrastate communications is impossible or impractical, the Supreme Court has recognized the Commission’s authority to preempt state regulation that would thwart or impede the lawful exercise of federal authority over the interstate component of the communications.66 The D.C. Circuit, for example, applied this impossibility exception in affirming a Commission order preempting state regulation of the rate a local exchange carrier (LEC) charged an interexchange carrier for a disconnection service.67 The court explained that Commission preemption of state regulation is permissible when the matter to be regulated has both interstate and intrastate aspects; preemption is necessary to protect a valid federal regulatory objective; and “state regulation would ‘negate[ ] the exercise by the FCC of its own lawful authority’ because regulation of the interstate aspects of the matter cannot be ‘unbundled’ from regulation of the intrastate aspects.”68 Such is the case with DigitalVoice service as discussed in detail below.

65 SeeLouisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 476 U.S. at 375 n.4 (citing North Carolina Utils. Comm’n v. FCC, 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1027 (1976); North Carolina Utils. Comm’n v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036 (4th Cir. 1977) cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874 (1977) (upholding Commission preemption of state regulation because it was not possible to separate the interstate and intrastate components of the asserted Commission regulation)); see also New York State Comm’n on Cable Television v. FCC, 749 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (affirming Commission order preempting state and local entry regulation of satellite master antenna television); Promotion of Competitive Networks in Local Telecommunications Markets; Wireless Communications Association International, Inc. Petition for Rulemaking to Amend Section 1.4000 of the Commission’s Rules to Preempt Restrictions on Subscriber Premises Reception or Transmission Antennas Designed to Provide Fixed Wireless Services; Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Review of Sections 68.104, and 68.213 of the Commission’s Rules Concerning Connection of Simple Inside Wiring to the Telephone Network , WT Docket No. 99-217; CC Docket Nos. 96-98, 88-57, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Fifth Report and Order and Memorandum Opinion and Order; Fourth Report and Order and Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 FCC Rcd 22983, 23031-32, para. 107 (2000) (preempting state regulation of fixed wireless antennas as an impediment to the full achievement of important federal objectives).

66SeeLouisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 476 U.S. at 368-69. The Court also said that the “critical question in any pre-emption analysis is always whether Congress intended that federal regulation supersede state law.” Id. at 369. As summarized by the Supreme Court, federal law and policy preempt state action in several circumstances: (1) where compliance with both federal and state law is in effect physically impossible (citingFlorida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132); (2) when there is outright or actual conflict between federal and state law (citing Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962)); (3) where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full objectives of Congress (citingHines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941)); (4) when Congress expresses a clear intent to preempt state law; (5) where there is implicit in federal law a barrier to state regulation; and (6) where Congress has legislated comprehensively, thus occupying an entire field of regulation. Additionally, the Supreme Court has held that preemption may result not only from action taken by Congress but also from a federal agency action that is within the scope of the agency’s congressionally delegated authority. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 476 U.S. at 369 ( citingFidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982); Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984)).

67 See Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Maryland v. FCC, 909 F.2d 1510 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

68Id. at 1515 (citing National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm’rs v. FCC, 880 F.2d 422, 429-31 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 883 F.2d 104, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Public Util. Comm’n of Texas v. FCC, 886 F.2d 1325, 1329, 1331-33 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).

Vonage Holdings Corporation Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning an Order of the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, WC Docket No. 03-211, Memorandum Opinion and Order (FCC Nov. 12, 2004 )

FCC : Telecom Services

20. Regardless of the definitional classification of DigitalVoice under the Communications Act, the Minnesota Vonage Order directly conflicts with our pro-competitive deregulatory rules and policies governing entry regulations, tariffing, and other requirements arising from these regulations for services such as DigitalVoice.69 Were DigitalVoice to be classified a telecommunications service, Vonage would be considered a nondominant, competitive telecommunications provider for which the Commission has eliminated entry and tariff filing requirements with respect to services like DigitalVoice.70 In particular, in completely eliminating interstate market entry requirements, the Commission reasoned that retaining entry requirements could stifle new and innovative services whereas blanket entry authority, i.e., unconditional entry, would promote competition.71 State entry and certification requirements, such as the Minnesota Commission’s, require the filing of an application which must contain detailed information regarding all aspects of the qualifications of the would-be service provider, including public disclosure of detailed financial information, operational and business plans, and proposed service offerings.72 The application process can take months and result in denial of a certificate, thus preventing entry altogether.73 Similarly, when the Commission ordered the mandatory detariffing of most interstate, domestic, interexchange services (including services like DigitalVoice), the Commission found that prohibiting such tariffs would promote competition and the public interest, and that tariffs for these services may actually harm consumers by impeding the development of vigorous competition.74 Tariffs and “price lists,” such as those required by Minnesota’s statutes and rules, are lengthy documents subject to specific filing and notice requirements that must contain every rate, term, and condition of service offered by the provider, including terms and conditions to which the provider may be subject in its certificate of authority.75 The Minnesota Commission may also require the filing of cost-justification information or order a change in a rate, term or condition set forth in the tariff.76 The administrative process involved in entry certification and tariff filing requirements, alone, introduces substantial delay in time-to-market and ability to respond to changing consumer demands, not to mention the impact these processes have on how an entity subject to such requirements provides its service.

. . . . .

22. Thus, under existing Commission precedent, regardless of its definitional classification, and unless it is possible to separate a Minnesota-only component of DigitalVoice from the interstate component, Minnesota’s order produces a direct conflict with our federal law and policies, and impermissibly encroaches on our exclusive jurisdiction over interstate services such as DigitalVoice.

69While we do not rely on it as a basis for our action in this Order, we also note that section 253 of the Act provides the Commission additional preemption authority over state regulations that “prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of an entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service.” 47 U.S.C. § 253. See Vonage Petition at 28 n.55 (indicating it does not submit its petition under section 253). Were DigitalVoice to be classified as a telecommunications service, however, it is possible that we could find state economic regulation such as that imposed by Minnesota to be a prohibition on the provision of an interstate and intrastate telecommunications services under section 253. See Vonage Petition at 11, 28 (describing that it is technically and practically impossible to comply with Minnesota’s “telephone company” rules).

70See, e.g., Implementation of Section 402(b)(2)(A) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Petition for Forbearance of the Independent Telephone & Telecommunications Alliance, CC Docket No. 97-11; AAD File No. 98-43, Report and Order and Second Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 FCC Rcd 11364, 11372-75, paras. 12-16 (1999) (Section 214 Order) (granting blanket section 214 authority for new lines of all domestic carriers including dominant carriers like the Bell operating companies (BOCs)); Policy and Rules Concerning the Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace; Implementation of Section 245(g) of the Communications Act of 1934 , CC Docket No. 96-61, Second Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd 20730 (1996) (Interexchange Detariffing Order) (adopting mandatory detariffing of most domestic interstate, interexchange services); Order on Reconsideration, 12 FCC 15014 (1997); Second Order on Reconsideration and Erratum, 14 FCC Rcd 6004 (1999), aff'd, MCI WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 209 F.3d 760 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations Therefor, First Report and Order, 85 FCC 2d 1 (1980) (subsequent history omitted) (Competitive Carrier Proceeding) ( adopting regulatory framework based on dominant or nondominant status of carriers).

71See Section 214 Order, 14 FCC Rcd at 11373, para. 14 (“By its very terms, blanket authority removes regulatory hurdles to market entry, thereby promoting competition.”); id. at 11373, para. 13 (“Rather than maintaining [entry requirements] that may stifle new and innovative services[,] … we believe it is more consistent with the goals of the 1996 Act to remove this hurdle.”).

72 See Minn. Rule § 7812.0200.

73 See Minn. Stat. § 237.16(c)

74See Interexchange Detariffing Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 20760, para. 52 (emphasis added) (“ [W]e find that not permitting nondominant interexchange carriers to file tariffs with respect to interstate, domestic, interexchange services will enhance competition among providers of such services, promote competitive market conditions, and achieve other objectives that are in the public interest, including eliminating the possible invocation of the filed rate doctrine by nondominant interexchange carriers, and establishing market conditions that more closely resemble an unregulated environment.”); id. at 20750, para. 37 (“We also adopt the tentative conclusion that in the interstate, domestic, interexchange market, requiring nondominant interexchange carriers to file tariffs for interstate, domestic, interexchange services may harm consumers by impeding the development of vigorous competition, which could lead to higher rates.”). We note that certain exceptions to the Commission’s mandatory detariffing rules exist; however, these exceptions would not apply to services like DigitalVoice were it to be classified a telecommunications service.

75 See Minn. Stat. § 237.07; see also, e.g., Minn. Rules §§ 7812.0300(6), 7812.0350(6), 7812.2210(2).

76 See, e.g., Minn. Rule §§ 7812.2210(4),(8).

Vonage Holdings Corporation Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning an Order of the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, WC Docket No. 03-211, Memorandum Opinion and Order (FCC Nov. 12, 2004)

FCC: Information Services

21. On the other hand, if DigitalVoice were to be classified as an information service, it would be subject to the Commission’s long-standing national policy of nonregulation of information services,77 particularly regarding economic regulation such as the type imposed on Vonage in the Minnesota Vonage Order.78 In a series of proceedings beginning in the 1960’s, the Commission issued orders finding that economic regulation of information services would disserve the public interest because these services lacked the monopoly characteristics that led to such regulation of common carrier services historically. The Commission found the market for these services to be competitive and best able to “burgeon and flourish” in an environment of “free give-and-take of the market place without the need for and possible burden of rules, regulations and licensing requirements.”79

77See Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and Communication Services and Facilities, Docket No. 16979, Notice of Inquiry, 7 FCC 2d 11 (1966) (Computer INOI); Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and Communication Services and Facilities, Docket No. 16979, Final Decision and Order, 28 FCC 2d 267 (1971) (Computer I Final Decision); Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), Docket No. 20828, Tentative Decision and Further Notice of Inquiry and Rulemaking, 72 FCC 2d 358 (1979) (Computer II Tentative Decision); Computer II Final Decision, 77 FCC 2d 384 (1980); Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry), CC Docket No. 85-229, Report and Order, 104 FCC 2d 958 (1986) (Computer III) (subsequent history omitted) (collectively the Computer Inquiry Proceeding). In its Second Computer Inquiry proceeding, the Commission “adopted a regulatory scheme that distinguished between the common carriage offering of basic transmission services and the offering of enhanced services.” Computer II Final Decision, 77 FCC 2d at 387; see alsoComputer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Company Provision of Enhanced Services; 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review – Review of Computer III and ONA Safeguards and Requirements, 13 FCC Rcd 6040, 6064, para. 38 (1998). The former services are regulated under Title II and the latter services are not. See Computer II Final Decision, 77 FCC 2d at 428-30, 432-43, paras. 113-18, 124-49 (indicating it would not serve the public interest to subject enhanced service providers to traditional common carrier regulation under Title II because, among other things, the enhanced services market was “truly competitive”). The 1996 Act uses different terminology (i.e., “telecommunications services” and “information services”) than used by the Commission in its Computer Inquiry proceeding, but the Commission has determined that “enhanced services” and “information services” should be interpreted to extend to the same functions, although the definition in the 1996 Act is even broader. See Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272 of the Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, CC Docket No. 96-149, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd 21905, 21955-56, para. 102 (1996) (Non-Accounting Safeguards Order) (subsequent history omitted) (explaining that all enhanced services are information services, but information services are broader and may not be enhanced services).

78See, e.g., Pulver, 19 FCC Rcd at 3317-20, paras. 17-20 (explaining the Commission’s policy of nonregulation for information services and how the 1996 Act reinforces this policy). This policy of nonregulation refers primarily to economic, public-utility type regulation, as opposed to generally applicable commercial consumer protection statutes, or similar generally applicable state laws. Indeed, the preeminence of federal authority over information services has prevailed unless a carrier-provided information service could be characterized as “purely intrastate,” see California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217, 1239-42 (9th Cir. 1990), or it is possible to separate out the interstate and intrastate components and state regulation of the intrastate component would not negate valid Commission regulatory goals. SeeCalifornia v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 1994) (California III), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1050 (1995) (affirming Commission preemption of certain state requirements for separation of facilities and personnel in the BOC provision of jurisdictionally mixed enhanced services as state regulations would negate national policy).

79SeeComputer II Final Decision, 77 FCC 2d at 425-33, paras. 109-27 (citing Computer I, Tentative Decision, 27 FCC 2d at 297-298).

Vonage Holdings Corporation Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning an Order of the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, WC Docket No. 03-211, Memorandum Opinion and Order (FCC Nov. 12, 2004)


We determine, consistent with our precedent regarding information services, that FWD is an unregulated information service and any state regulations that seek to treat FWD as a telecommunications service or otherwise subject it to public-utility type regulation would almost certainly pose a conflict with our policy of nonregulation.55
    16. As discussed more fully below, two separate lines of reasoning compel this determination. First, federal authority has already been recognized as preeminent in the area of information services, and particularly in the area of the Internet and other interactive computer services, which Congress has explicitly stated should remain free of regulation.56 In reaching this conclusion, we note that the Commission's traditional test for determining the boundaries of interstate versus intrastate jurisdiction - the end-to-end analysis - is inapplicable in the context of FWD and, even if it were applicable, would not support a finding of intrastate jurisdiction.57 Second, state-by-state regulation of a wholly Internet-based service is inconsistent with the controlling federal role over interstate commerce required by the Constitution.58
    17. Asserting federal jurisdiction over FWD is consistent with - and supported by - the states' already-limited role with regard to information services. The Commission has, on prior occasions, determined that certain state regulations of information services would conflict with the national policy of nonregulation.59 Several decades ago, the Commission recognized in its Computer Inquiry proceeding60 that enhanced services would continue to develop best in an  unregulated environment and, given the competitive nature of the market, regulation of enhanced services was thus unwarranted.61 For example, in adopting non-structural requirements for the Bell operating company provision of enhanced services, the Commission recognized that certain state requirements affecting the intrastate portion of jurisdictionally mixed enhanced services would thwart Commission objectives and thus were not permitted.62 Indeed, in those instances where the states have attempted to assert jurisdiction, this Commission has been affirmed in asserting its national policy of nonregulation.63 Consequently, states have generally played a very limited role with regard to information services. We see no reason to depart from this precedent here.
    18. Passage of the 1996 Act increases substantially the likelihood that any state attempt to impose economic regulation of FWD would conflict with federal policy.64 In section 230 of the 1996 Act, Congress expressed its clear preference for a national policy "to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services" unfettered by Federal or State regulation.65 Courts have repeatedly recognized this congressional intent and, as a result, have rejected state attempts to regulate such services.66 In addition, in section 706 of the 1996 Act Congress required the Commission to
encourage deployment of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans by using measures that "promote competition in the local telecommunications market."67 We recognize that most states have not acted to produce an outright conflict between federal and state law that justifies Commission preemption,68 but nevertheless confirm that the Commission does have the authority to act in this area if states promulgate regulations applicable to FWD's service that are inconsistent with its current nonregulated status.
    19. We find that granting Pulver's petition and declaring FWD to be an unregulated information service subject to Commission jurisdiction will facilitate the further development of FWD and Internet applications like it and these offerings, in turn, will encourage more consumers to demand broadband service.69 Ensuring that FWD, as it is currently offered, remains unregulated by the  Commission or the states is thus consistent with the requirements of  the Act.70 To rule otherwise would effectively apply a regulatory paradigm that was previously developed for different types of services, which were provided over a vastly different type of
network. Indeed, we would risk eliminating an innovative service offering that, as noted by Pulver, promotes consumer choice, technological development and the growth of the Internet, and universal service objectives.71 For reasons provided herein, that FWD happens to, among other things, enable members to talk over the Internet, as opposed to play video games, for example, does not affect our conclusion that FWD is most appropriately characterized as an unregulated information service.
    20. Unless an information service can be characterized as "purely intrastate,"72 or it is practically and economically possible to separate interstate and intrastate components of a jurisdictionally mixed information service without negating federal objectives for the interstate component, exclusive Commission jurisdiction has prevailed.73 FWD clearly can not appropriately be characterized as a purely intrastate information service. FWD's members currently reside in over 170 countries around the world, with less than 33% of those members indicating their country of residence as the United States.74 Of those members based in the United States, all 50 states are identified as member locations.75 Because FWD facilitates its members' ability to contact any of its other members worldwide, to communicate with more than one at any given time, and because these members' physical locations can continually change, it is evident that the capabilities FWD provides its members are not purely intrastate capabilities. Moreover, it would be impractical to determine whether there was any intrastate component to FWD given the fact that FWD's information service as provided to its members occurs solely within the confines of the Internet.
    21. Indeed, these characteristics of FWD render our normal approach to determining jurisdiction -the end-to-end analysis -unhelpful. Traditionally, the Commission has applied its so-called end-to-end analysis, looking at the end points of a communication, to determine the jurisdictional nature of any given service.76 Briefly, the Commission considers the "continuous path of communications," beginning with the inception of a call to its completion, and has rejected attempts to divide communications at any intermediate points between providers.77 While our traditional end-to-end approach to determining a communication's jurisdiction has relevance for a circuit-switched network, it has little or none with regard to FWD. Indeed, in the case of FWD the concept of "end points" has little relevance. What Pulver provides is information on its server located on the Internet.78 If an FWD member uses that information to set up communications, such as voice, between itself and other members, that communication- the only conceivable "end points" involved here-is transmitted by that member's ISP over the Internet. That does not, however, impute those "end points" to FWD, which remains a server on the Internet. Furthermore, even if the members' locations were somehow relevant to their use of FWD, FWD's portable nature without fixed geographic origination or termination points means that no one but the members themselves know where the end points are.79 Attempting to require Pulver to locate its members for the purpose of adhering to a regulatory analysis that served another network would be forcing changes on this service for the sake of regulation itself, rather than for any particular policy purpose. The Act counsels against it,80 and we decline to do it. Finally, we are not aware that the Commission has ever applied an end-to-end-analysis for determining the jurisdiction of a particular service where the service provider was not itself providing some aspect of the user's underlying transmission capability.
    22. We find that even if some form of an end-to-end analysis were deemed applicable to FWD, FWD would be considered an interstate information service in accordance with our "mixed use" doctrine.81 Where separating interstate traffic from intrastate traffic is impossible or impractical, the Commission has declared such traffic to be interstate in nature.82 Based on the record in this proceeding, it is evident that it is impossible or impractical to attempt to separate FWD into interstate and intrastate components.83 This "impossibility" results from the global portability feature of an FWD member's unique identification number, enabling that member to initiate and receive on-line communications from anywhere in the world where it can access the Internet via a broadband connection.84 Moreover, FWD's technology does not enable Pulver to determine the actual physical location of an underlying IP address.85 Finally, it is evident that more than a de minimus amount of FWD's offering is interstate.86 Therefore, we would analogize the FWD offering to those previously deemed exclusively interstate by the Commission where it has applied its "mixed use" rule.87
    23. Finally, our conclusions today also are consistent with the Commerce Clause, which denies "the States the power unjustifiably to discriminate against or burden the interstate flow of articles of commerce."88 The nature of FWD as an Internet application not bound by geography may well render an attempt by a state to regulate any theoretical intrastate FWD component an impermissible extraterritorial reach.89 In other words, as we have noted above, FWD itself is merely an Internet application available on Pulver's server, which members anywhere reach via the Internet. FWD members reaching Pulver's server to initiate a communication may be located anywhere in the world where an Internet connection is available to them. Because of the way FWD is offered, one state's regulation of FWD may have the practical effect of requiring those same regulations to be applied to FWD service for all users.
    24. Moreover, even where state regulation is not a per se violation of the Commerce Clause, courts have inquired whether the burden imposed on interstate commerce by state regulation would be "clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."90 This may well be the case with respect to FWD. As an initial matter, we cannot envision how state economic regulation of the FWD service described in this proceeding could benefit the public. In contrast, however, the burdens upon interstate commerce would be significant. Even if it were relevant and possible to track the geographic location of packets and isolate traffic for the purpose of ascertaining state jurisdiction over a theoretical intrastate component of an otherwise integrated bit stream, such efforts would be impractical. Tracking FWD's packets to determine their geographic location would involve the installation of systems that are unrelated to providing its service to end users. Rather, imposing such compliance costs on providers such as Pulver would
be designed simply to comply with legacy distinctions between the federal and state jurisdictions. Here, such distinctions do not appear to serve any legitimate public policy purpose. Investment in such systems would improve neither service nor efficiency. In a dynamic market such as the market for Internet applications like FWD, we find that imposing this substantial burden would make little sense and would almost certainly be significant and negative for the development of new and innovative IP services and applications.
    25. Furthermore, if Pulver were subject to state regulation, it would have to satisfy the requirements of more than 50 state and other jurisdictions with more than 50 different certification, tariffing and other regulatory obligations. State regulation of FWD would make FWD unique among Internet applications as the only Internet application to be subject to such state obligations. Indeed, allowing the imposition of state regulation would eliminate any benefit of using the Internet to provide the service: the Internet enables individuals and small providers, such as Pulver, to reach a global market simply by attaching a server to the Internet; requiring Pulver to submit to more than 50 different regulatory regimes as soon as it did so would eliminate this fundamental advantage of IP-based communication. Certainly, it is this kind of impact Congress considered when it made clear statements about leaving the Internet and
interactive computer services free of unnecessary federal and state regulation noted above.91

52 See Pulver Dec. 11 Ex Parte Letter at 3 (acknowledging that there is "some transmission involved in the
provision of FWD").
53
See Non-Accounting Safeguards Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 21956, para. 103.
54 While we do not rely on the framework outlined by the Commission in its 1998 Report to Congress, we note that the conclusion we reach here that FWD is an information service is consistent with the framework discussed by the Commission in that report for two reasons: (1) to the extent FWD service is carried out entirely over the Internet using computer-based software, this resembles what that report characterized as computer-to-computer VoIP and, as contemplated therein, would be considered an information service; and (2) FWD fails the four-prong test for determining whether it is a phone-to-phone service, specifically, because it does not use NANP numbers and does not use the same CPE as may be used for circuit-switched calls (rather it uses dedicated SIP phones or soft phones). See Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, CC Docket No. 96-45, Report to Congress, 13 FCC Rcd 11501, 11520, para. 39 (1998) (Stevens Report).
55 We note that this conclusion is confined to the FWD service as described in this Order. See supra note 3.
56 See 47 U.S.C. § 230; see also infra para. 18. In section 230(e)(2) Congress defines "interactive computer
service" as "any information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server." 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (emphasis added).
57 See 47 U.S.C. § 153(22) (defining "interstate communication"). In section 2(a) of the Act, Congress has given the Commission exclusive jurisdiction over interstate communications. 47 U.S.C. § 152(a). Section 2(b) of the Act reserves to the states jurisdiction over intrastate services. See 47 U.S.C. § 152(b); see infra note 81.
58 See infra paras. 23-25 (discussing the applicability of the Commerce Clause).
59 California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919, 931 (9th Cir. 1994) (When state regulations would negate national policy, the Commission may preempt state regulations.).
60 The Commission launched its Computer Inquiry proceedings more than 30 years ago. See Regulatory and
Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and Communication Services and Facilities,
Docket No. 16979, Notice of Inquiry, 7 FCC 2d 11 (1966) (Computer I NOI); Regulatory and Policy Problems
Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and Communication Services and Facilities, Docket No. 16979, Final Decision and Order, 28 FCC 2d 267 (1971) (Computer I Final Decision); Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), Docket No. 20828, Tentative Decision and Further Notice of Inquiry and Rulemaking, 72 FCC 2d 358 (1979) (Computer II Tentative Decision); Computer II Final Decision, 77 FCC 2d 384 (1980); Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry), CC Docket No. 85-229, Report and Order, 104 FCC 2d 958 (1986) (Computer III) (subsequent cites omitted) (collectively the Computer Inquiry). In its Second Computer Inquiry proceeding, the Commission "adopted a regulatory scheme that distinguished between the common carriage offering of basic transmission services and the offering of enhanced services." Computer II Final Decision, 77 FCC 2d at 387; Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Company Provision of Enhanced Services; 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review - Review of Computer III and ONA Safeguards and Requirements, 13 FCC Rcd 6040, 6064, para. 38 (1998). The former services are regulated under Title II and the latter services are not. See Computer II Final Decision, 77 FCC 2d at 428-30, 432-43 (indicating it would not serve the public interest to subject enhanced service providers to traditional common carrier regulation under Title II because, among other things, the enhanced services market was "truly competitive"). Although the 1996 Act uses different terminology (i.e., "telecommunications services" and "information services") than used by the Commission in its Computer Inquiry proceeding, the Commission has determined that "enhanced services" and "information services" should be interpreted to extend to the same functions, although the definition in 1996 Act is even broader. See Non- Accounting Safeguards Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 21955-56, para. 102 (explaining that all enhanced services are information services, but information services are broader and may not be enhanced services).
61 Computer II Final Decision, 77 FCC 2d at 433, paras. 127-28 ("[W]e believe the market for these [enhanced] services will continue to burgeon and flourish best in the existing competitive environment") (further citations omitted); see Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), Docket No. 20828, 88 FCC 2d 512, 541, para. 83 n.34 (Computer II Further Reconsideration Order) ("we have determined that the provision of enhanced services is not a common carrier public utility offering and that the efficient utilization and full exploitation of the interstate telecommunications network would best be achieved if these services are free from public utility-type regulation."). Indeed, the Commission said that states "may not impose common carrier tariff regulation on a carrier's provision of enhanced services," id., and such state"regulation of entry and service terms and conditions (including rates and features availability) ostensibly applied to 'intrastate' enhanced services would have a severe impact" on federal open entry policies. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry), CC Docket No. 85-229, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 2 FCC Rcd 3035, 3070, n.374. (1987) (Computer III Phase I Recon). The precise contours of these state limitations were the subject of continued litigation. See Computer and Communications Industry Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (on appeal of Computer II the court explicitly noted the Commission's preemption of any state regulation of enhanced services, affirming Computer II
in its entirety); id. at 205-06 nn. 26-28; California v. FCC, 905 F. 2d 1217, 1239-1242 (9th Cir. 1990) (California I) (vacating Computer III preemption of all state regulation of enhanced services due to Commission's failure to consider the possibility of "purely intrastate enhanced services" and what effect state regulation may have on valid Commission goals); but see California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirming Commission preemption of state requirements for structural separation of facilities and personnel used to provide the intrastate portion of jurisdictionally mixed enhanced services, and state regulations regarding CPNI and network disclosure rules). The Commission has stated that it has exclusive jurisdiction to regulate enhanced services where it is not possible to separate out the interstate and intrastate components and state regulations would negate valid Commission regulatory goals. See Policy and Rules Concerning the Interstate Interexchange Marketplace, CC Docket No. 96-6, Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 FCC Rcd 21531, 21553 (1998) (citing California III).
62 See Computer III Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Company Safeguards and Tier 1 Local Exchange
Company Safeguards, 6 FCC Rcd 7571, 7632, paras. 122-24 (BOC Safeguards Order) (preempting state
requirements for separation of facilities and personnel in the provision of jurisdictionally mixed enhanced services); see also note 81 infra (discussing the Commission's "mixed use" standard to determine jurisdiction).
63 See California III, 39 F.3d 932; see also Petition For Emergency Relief And Declaratory Ruling Filed By The BellSouth Corporation, 7 FCC Rcd 1619, 1620, para. 7 (BellSouth MemoryCall) (preempting order of the state public utility commission because of its impact on a BellSouth jurisdictionally mixed information service).
64 See MCI Dec. 12 Ex Parte Letter at 3 n.8 (quoting AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 377-80 & n.6 (1999) ("[T]he question in these cases is not whether the Federal Government has taken the regulation of local telecommunications competition away from the States. With regard to the matters addressed by the 1996 Act, it unquestionably has.")). As noted previously by the Commission, through its 1996 Act, Congress codified the distinction that the Commission made between "basic services" and "enhanced services" (as "telecommunications services" and "information services"). See Non-Accounting Safeguards Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 21955-56, para. 102. By not including information services within the ambit of Title II, Congress expressed a preference that information services not be regulated. Although the Commission has clear authority to do so, it has only rarely sought to regulate information services using its Title I ancillary authority. See Section 255 Order, 16 FCC Rcd at 6457.
65 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2).
66 See, e.g., Vonage Holdings Co. v. Minnesota Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 290 F. Supp. 2d 993, 997, 1001-02 (D.
Minn. 2003); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 153 F.3d 523, 544 (8th Cir. 1998); Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
67 47 U.S.C. § 157 nt. Section 706 of the 1996 Act is located in the notes of section 7 and we note that section 7, itself, clearly explains that it is the policy of the United States to encourage the provision of new technologies and services to the public. To implement this mandate, the Commission has considered, among other things, whether its rules promote the delivery of innovative advanced services offerings. See Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, CC Docket Nos. 01-338, 96-98, 98-147, Report and Order and Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd 16978, 17125-26, para. 242 (2003) (Triennial Review Order), corrected by Errata, 18 FCC Rcd 19020 (2003) (Triennial Review Order Errata), petitions for review pending, United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, D.C. Cir. No. 00-1012 (and consolidated cases). We find that our actions in this ruling are also consistent with this provision of the Act.
68 See Vonage Holdings Corporation Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning an Order of the Minnesota
Public Utilities Commission, WC Docket No. 03-211 (filed Sept. 22, 2003).
69 As noted above, Congress has clearly indicated that information services are not subject to the economic and entry/exit regulation inherent in Title II. In so doing, however, Congress has provided the Commission with ancillary authority under Title I to impose such regulations as may be necessary to carry out its other mandates under the Act. We expressly decline to exercise Title I jurisdiction over FWD to impose any economic or entry/exit regulation. Such regulation would not only run counter to our decades old goals and objectives to enable information services to function in a freely competitive, unregulated environment, but would directly contravene Congress's express directives in sections 706 and 230 of the Act that services such as FWD not be subject to suchregulation. Moreover, we decline to impose any other type of regulation on Pulver's FWD information service at this time.
70 Any state attempt to impose economic or other regulations that treat FWD like a telecommunications service would impermissibly interfere with the Commission's valid federal interest in encouraging the further development of Internet applications such as these, unfettered by Federal or state regulation, and thus would be preempted.
71 Pulver Reply at 6.
72 See California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (1990). We recognize that states theoretically could have a role in
regulating a purely intrastate information service, but we doubt that, with the particular service at issue here, any state could claim FWD to be "purely intrastate."
73 See supra para. 17.
74 See Pulver Jan. 15 Ex Parte Letter, Attach. at 3-4; Pulver Jan. 20 Ex Parte Letter at 1 (indicating there are currently about 141,000 registered FWD members, approximately 45,000 of which identify themselves with an address in the United States).
75 See Pulver Jan. 20 Ex Parte Letter at 1.
76 See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 206 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
77 See, e.g., BellSouth Memory Call, 7 FCC Rcd at 1620; Teleconnect Company v. Bell Telephone Company of Penn., 10 FCC Rcd 1626, 1629 (1995); GTE ADSL Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 22466, 22475-78, paras. 17-21. In the GTE ADSL Order, the Commission disagreed that an end-to-end ADSL communication must be separated into two components - an intrastate telecommunications service (provided in this instance by GTE) and an interstate information service (provided by an ISP). GTE ADSL Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 22477-78, para. 20.
78 In the GTE ADSL Order, the Commission identified the practical difficulties of applying its end-to-end analysis to Internet communications by noting that such communications do not necessarily have an identifiable point of"termination," in the traditional sense, for jurisdictional purposes. GTE ADSL Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 22479, para. 22. In a more recent context, the Commission similarly found it difficult to pinpoint the origination of a communication arising over the Internet. Provision of Improved Telecommunications Relay Services and Speechto- Speech Services for Individuals with Hearing and Speech Disabilities, CC Docket No. 98-97, Declaratory Ruling and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 FCC 7779, 7784, para. 15 (2002) (Because the first leg of an IP Relay call comes over the Internet, rather than from a telephone, there is no automatic way to determine whether any call is intrastate or interstate. This is because Internet addresses do not have geographic correlates, and there is currently no Internet address identifier that can automatically give the location of the caller.). In the FNPRM in that proceeding, the Commission tentatively proposed to use an end-to-end analysis to define whether anIP Relay call is interstate or intrastate for the limited purpose of determining a statutorily mandated cost allocation. Id. at 7792, para. 42; see also 47 U.S.C. § 225(d)(3)(B). That proceeding is still pending. Furthermore, unlike the FWD communications addressed in this Order, the IP Relay call does not both begin and end in the Internet.
79 See Pulver Dec. 16 Ex Parte Letter at 1-2.
80 See supra para. 18.
81 See MTS and WATS Market Structure, Amendment of Part 36 of the Commission's Rules and Establishment of a Joint Board, CC Docket Nos. 78-72, 80-286, Decision and Order, 4 FCC Rcd 5660, n.7 (1989) (MTS/WATS Market Structure Separations Order) (the Commission found that "mixed use" special access lines carrying more than a de minimis amount of interstate traffic to private line systems are subject to the Commission's jurisdiction because traffic on many such lines could not be measured without "significant additional administrative efforts").
82 Id.
83 See, e.g., MCI Dec. 12 Ex Parte Letter at 1; Cisco Dec. 11 Ex Parte Letter at 5; Level 3 Dec. 16 Ex Parte Letter at 2; Verizon Feb.5 Ex Parte Letter at 2.
84 See Pulver Dec. 16 Ex Parte Letter at 1-2.
85 Id.
86 See supra para. 20.
87 See, e.g., Cisco Dec. 11 Ex Parte Letter at 4-5; Vonage Dec. 10 Ex Parte Letter at 3-4.
88 U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; see also Oregon Waste Sys. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994).
89 See Cotto Waxo Co. v. Williams, 46 F.3d 790, 793 (8th Cir. 1995) ("Under the Commerce Clause, a state
regulation is per se invalid when it has an 'extraterritorial reach,' that is, when the statute has the practical effect of controlling conduct beyond the boundaries of the state. The Commerce Clause precludes application of a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the state's borders.") (citation omitted).
90 See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); see also Cotto Waxo Co. at 793 ("[I]f the challenged statute regulates evenhandedly, then it burdens interstate commerce indirectly and is subject to a balancing test. Under the balancing test, a state statute violates the Commerce Clause only if the burdens it imposes on interstate commerce are 'clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.'") (citation omitted).
91 We note the existence of other "network"-based service examples where, although an intrastate component of such service may exist, this intrastate component must nonetheless yield to exclusive federal jurisdiction in the area of economic or other state regulations affecting entry to advance articulated congressional or federal deregulatory objectives. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C.A. § 14501 (preempting state economic regulation of motor carriers); Carsten v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 1996 WL 335421(E.D.Cal.1996) (holding that section 14501(c)(1) clearly reaffirms Congress's intent to preempt state laws relating to the prices of motor carriers); 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(A) (preempting state regulation of entry or rates of commercial mobile radio service providers); New York State Commission v. FCC, 749 F.2d 804 (1984) (preempting state and local entry regulation of satellite master antenna television.).
        -- In re Petition for Declaratory Ruling that pulver.com's Free World Dialup is Neither Telecommunications Nor a Telecommunications Service, WC Docket No. 03-45, Memorandum Opinion And Order  (FCC February 19, 2004)

States: Pre-empted: Information Service

The Court must follow the statutory intent expressed by Congress, and interpreted by the FCC. Short of explicit statutory language, the Court can find no stronger guidance for determining that Vonage's service is an information service, as defined by Congress and interpreted by the FCC.
     Having determined that Vonage's services constitute information services, the Court next examines Congress's intent with regard to state regulation of information services, to determine whether the MPUC’s order is pre-empted. By clearly separating information services from telecommunications services, the Court finds ample support for the proposition that Congress intended to keep the Internet and information services unregulated.
    Because Congress has expressed an intent that services like Vonage’s must remain unregulated by the Communications Act, and because the MPUC has exercised state authority to regulate Vonage’s service, the Court concludes that that state and federal laws conflict, and pre-emption is necessary. Louisiana PSC, 476 U.S. at 368, 106 S.Ct. at 1898.
    Where federal policy is to encourage certain conduct, state law discouraging that conduct must be pre-empted. See Xerox Corp. v. County of Harris, 459 U.S. 145, 151-53, 103 S.Ct. 523, 527-29 (1982) (holding state tax could not be imposed on Mexican-manufactured goods shipped to the United states where Congress clearly intended to create a duty-free enclave to  encourage merchants to use American ports); see also 1 Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 6-29, at 1181-82 (3d ed. 2000) (“state action must ordinarily be invalidated if its manifest effect is to penalize or discourage conduct that federal law specifically seeks to encourage”).
    In the Universal Service Report, the FCC explained that policy considerations required keeping the definition of telecommunications services distinct from information services so that information services would be open to
healthy competition. Its discussion demonstrates the FCC’s reluctance to permit state regulation of information services providers, foreshadowing the very issue before the Court today:
An approach in which a broad range of information service providers are simultaneously classed as telecommunications carriers, and thus presumptively subject to the broad range of Title II constraints, could seriously curtail the regulatory freedom that the Commission concluded in Computer II was important to the healthy and competitive development of the enhanced-services industry. . . . The classification of information service providers as telecommunications carriers, moreover, could encourage states to impose common-carrier regulation on such providers. . . . State requirements for telecommunications carriers vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but include certification, tariff filing, and various reporting requirements and fees.
Universal Service Report, 13 FCC Rcd. ¶ 46, at 11524. The Court thus concludes that Minnesota regulations that have the effect of regulating information services are in conflict with federal law and must be pre-empted.
-- Vonage v. Minnesota PUC, Civil No. 03-5287, Sec. IV.A. (MJD/JGL) (DMN October 16, 2003)

2. There are both legal and policy implications presented by VoIP.  Before a state may regulate VoIP, the service must be considered intrastate  - which seems dubious given that Internet protocol packets often traverse several states before reaching their destination, even in an otherwise "local" call.  Recently, a federal judge in Minnesota  struck down a state agency's attempt to regulate VoIP just like traditional telephone service, holding that federal law preempts state regulation because VoIP is an "information service." Even if the Minnesota court's opinion is eventually reversed, the FCC may rule that VoIP is interstate in nature, and then the FCC likely would itself forebear from imposing much regulation upon the service.  Indeed, FCC Chairman Michael Powell recently opined that state and federal agencies should not regulate VoIP unless there is an absolutely compelling justification for doing so.
--In The Matter Of The Investigation Into Voice Over Internet Protocol (Voip) Services, Docket No. 03M-220T, Order Closing Docket ¶ 1 (Colorado PUC Dec. 17, 2003) (Chairman Gregory E. Sopkin Specially Concurring)

3. We note that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has asserted jurisdiction over the internet and related services, and has opened a docket to address issues raised by VoIP.  (Staff will continue to monitor the FCC proceedings and comments made by parties to the FCC's docket.)  Because of the legal uncertainty of whether a state may regulate VoIP services, as well as the host of policy issues involved with VoIP, we believe the most prudent course is to take no action with respect to VoIP pending FCC action.
--In The Matter Of The Investigation Into Voice Over Internet Protocol (Voip) Services, Docket No. 03M-220T, Order Closing Docket ¶ 2 ( Colorado PUC Dec. 17, 2003)

States: Not Preempted

We conclude that LocalDial’s service meets the definition of telecommunications under federal law.31 LocalDial does not provide information service or enhanced service.

The FCC has not preempted the states from regulating intrastate telecommunications services. We have the jurisdiction to decide, and are not preempted from deciding, whether LocalDial’s service is subject to our regulatory authority under chapter 80 RCW.

... LocalDial goes further with this line of argument to suggest that we await the outcome of the FCC’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) on IP-enabled services, which was initiated in March of this year. It is unclear whether the outcome of the NPRM will have any bearing on the issues pending here. Moreover, the timing of the NPRM is uncertain, but likely will consume much of this year and may extend into 2005. Considering that this matter is before us by referral from the Federal District Court, it would be inappropriate for us to not respond in a timely manner.
Washington Exchange Carriers Association v. LocalDial Corporation, Docket UT-031472, Order, p. 25 (WUTC June 11, 2004)



Vonage and others claim that state regulation of its service is preempted because: (1) Vonage offers information service under federal law; (2) state regulation of information services and the Internet is inconsistent with federal law; and (3) the interstate and intrastate aspects of its service cannot be segregated; or (4) its service is an Internet application and Congress declared that the Internet should be free of regulation.
    First, Vonage service is not an information service under federal law, despite claims to the contrary. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 14 (the 1996 Act) defines "telecommunications" as "the transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing without change in the form or content of the information as sent and received."15 The 1996 Act further defines "telecommunications service" as "offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public . regardless of the facilities used."16
    In contrast, "information service" is defined in the 1996 Act as "the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via telecommunications, and includes electronic publishing, but does not include any use of any such capability for the management, control, or operation of a telecommunications system or the management of a telecommunications service." 17
    The FCC view of the differences between telecommunications services and information services was discussed in its April 10, 1998, Report to Congress on Universal Service.18 The critical distinction drawn by the FCC in classifying a service as either information or telecommunications was whether the provider performed some function that modifies the information, or merely transmits it.19
    A Vonage customer's voice is transmitted between or among points specified by the customer, without any change in the form or content of the conversation. Nothing is changed, added or subtracted to the conversation in any way. Moreover, its provision of analog-to-IP (and vice-versa) conversion equipment in order to utilize the Internet as a transmission medium ultimately changes neither the form nor content of the caller's information. Consequently, Vonage's service is a "telecommunications service"
which can be regulated by the states.
    Likewise, Vonage's service is not an information service. It does not offer its customers a capability to manipulate or interact with stored data. Vonage's service merely transmits its users' voices between and among endpoints chosen by the caller.
With regard to its argument that it is an information service because it provides a net protocol conversion, the FCC has ruled that when there are protocol conversions at both ends of the call ("no net" protocol conversion), the service is a telecommunications
service.20 Vonage's service involves this type of "no net" protocol conversion. Its adapter and/or software convert its customers' speech into the Internet protocol (IP) data format. Vonage's network subsequently converts IP packets back to TDM in order to
facilitate calls between its customers and other carriers' telephone subscribers.
    Second, neither Congress nor the FCC has preempted state law. Section 601 of the 1996 Act states that the 1996 Act "shall not be construed to modify, impair or supersede Federal, State or local law unless expressly so provided."21 While Voice on
the Net Coalition argues that §230(b)22 of the Act preempts state regulation of IP telephony, this argument incorrectly states the intent of §230. Section 230 is entitled "Protection for private blocking and screening of offensive material," and is intended to
address the content of speech transmitted over the Internet rather than traditional common carrier regulation.
    Moreover, the FCC has not acted to preempt state law. While not binding, the FCC's report to Congress tentatively concluded that "phone-to-phone" IP telephony appears to be a telecommunications service.23 It makes no definitive statements, however, as to the statutory classification of other types of IP telephony.24 Instead, the FCC deferred classification of specific IP telephony services to further proceedings.25
    More recently, in a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the FCC initiated a global proceeding to investigate in detail the classification and appropriate regulation of the various forms of IP-enabled services, including Vonage-type services.26 Thus, Vonage's argument that state regulation conflicts with FCC findings is, at best, premature.
    Even if the FCC were to classify Vonage's service as an information service, the Commission would not be preempted from regulating its intrastate aspects. The Communications Act §152 (b) expressly preserves state jurisdiction over intrastate
information services.27
    Third, Vonage claims that the impossibility doctrine and the FCC's mixed use rule preempt state regulation of VoIP services such as those provided by Vonage. The impossibility doctrine holds that state jurisdiction over intrastate communications is
preserved unless it is impossible to separate the interstate and intrastate aspects of a service, and state regulation would negate the FCC's lawful exercise of its authority over interstate communications.28 The FCC has the burden of showing that its rules preempt
only state rules that actually interfere with its goals.29 It has made no such declaration. Moreover, Vonage's claim that it is technically impossible to separate intrastate and interstate regulation of its services is incorrect. The company's "Unlimited
Local Plan"30 allows customers unlimited local and regional calling and up to 500 minutes of long distance calls. By implementing this plan, the company has shown that it can distinguish local calls from long distance calls. Consequently, it is not impossible to
separate intrastate and interstate calls.
    The FCC's mixed use rule also does not apply to Vonage. The FCC established the mixed use rule as a way to establish the appropriate jurisdiction over special access lines where it was impractical to determine the jurisdictional status of the traffic.31 It was not used by the FCC for any purpose other than allocating special access jurisdiction32 and, therefore, is inapposite to Vonage's service.
    Finally, the claim that our jurisdiction is preempted because Congress declared that the Internet should be free of regulation misreads the Act. As we stated above, §230 is aimed at the content of speech on the Internet and does not affect states'
application of traditional common carrier regulation.
-- Complaint of Frontier Telephone of Rochester, Inc. Against Vonage Holdings Corporation Concerning Provision of Local Exchange and InterExchange Telephone Service in New York State in Violation of the Public Service Law, CASE 03-C-1285, Order Establishing Balanced Regulatory Framework for Vonage Holding Corporation, p. 11-15 (May 21, 2004)


Further, although there have been arguments that other states and the FCC are addressing the status of the VOIP technology, the Commission finds that, at this time, there is no evidence that supports the claim that this issue has been decided. Nor is there any federal law that preempts state law with respect to telephone services provided using VOIP technology. Further, the Minnesota Legislature has not exempted services provided by VOIP technology from regulation.
-- In the Matter of the Complaint of the Minnesota Department of Commerce Against Vonage Holding Corp Regarding Lack of Authority to Operate in Minnesota, Docket No. P-6214/C-03-108, Order Finding Jurisdiction And Requiring Compliance (Minnesota PUC Sept. 11, 2003) http://www.puc.state.mn.us/docs/orders/03-0108.pdf


The Commission has not definitively determined if any form of IP telephony is either telecommunications service or information service.4 In its 1998 Universal Service Report to Congress, the Commission observed that information service providers (ISPs) do not appear to be providing telecommunications when users of the ISP's services conduct "computer-to-computer" VOIP calls.5 In the same Report, however, the Commission opined that "phone-to-phone" VOIP telephony services appear to lack “the characteristics that would render them "information services’ within the meaning of the statute, and instead are ‘telecommunications services.’”6 The Commission deferred definitive resolution of these issues pending development of a fuller record. The allegations contained in Vonage's petition for declaratory ruling are insufficient for determining whether its service meets the Act’s definition of information service, particularly considering the specific exemption in the criteria for the use of the capabilities for the operation of a telecommunications service.
-- In re Vonage Holdings Corporation Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning an Order of the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, WC Docket No. 03-211, Comments of the New York State Department of Public Service (Oct 27, 2003) http://www.dps.state.ny.us/fcc/FCC_10_27_03_b.pdf

47 USC 230 - Unfettering

34. Congress’s definition of the Internet in the Act recognizes its global nature.115 In addition to defining the Internet in section 230 of the Act, Congress used section 230 to articulate its national Internet policy. There, Congress stated that “[i]t is the policy of the United States - to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”116 We have already determined in a prior order that section 230(b)(2) expresses Congress’s clear preference for a national policy to accomplish this objective.117 In Pulver, we found this policy to provide support for preventing state attempts to promulgate regulations that would apply to Pulver’s service.118 While we found Pulver’s FWD service to be an information service, the Internet policy Congress included in section 230 is indifferent to the statutory classification of services that may “promote its continued development.”119 Rather, it speaks generally to the “Internet and other interactive computer services,” a phrase that plainly embraces DigitalVoice service.120 Thus, irrespective of the statutory classification of DigitalVoice, it is embraced by Congress’s policy to “promote the continued development” and “preserve the vibrant and competitive free market” for these types of services.121

35. While the majority of those commenting on the applicability of section 230 in this proceeding share this view,122 others claim that section 230 relates only to content-based services and DigitalVoice is not the type of content-based service Congress intended to reach.123 We are cognizant, as we must be, of context as we review the statute, but we look primarily to the words Congress chose to use.124 While we acknowledge that the title of section 230 refers to “offensive material,” the general policy statements regarding the Internet and interactive computer services contained in the section are not similarly confined to offensive material. In the case of section 230, Congress articulated a very broad policy regarding the “Internet and other interactive computer services” without limitation to content-based services. Through codifying its Internet policy in the Commission’s organic statute, Congress charges the Commission with the ongoing responsibility to advance that policy consistent with our other statutory obligations. Accordingly, in interpreting section 230’s phrase “unfettered by Federal or State regulation,” we cannot permit more than 50 different jurisdictions to impose traditional common carrier economic regulations such as Minnesota’s on DigitalVoice and still meet our responsibility to realize Congress’s objective.

115In section 230(f) of the Act, Congress describes the Internet as “an international network of federal and non-federal interoperable packet switched data networks.” See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(1) (emphasis added). Similarly, in section 231, the Internet is defined in terms of computer facilities, transmission media, equipment and software “comprising the interconnected worldwide network of computer networks.” 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(3) (emphasis added). Courts have similarly described it. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997) (“The Internet is an international network of interconnected computers.”); see also Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 334 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating that section 230 represents Congress’s approach to a problem of national and international dimension “whose international character is apparent”). DigitalVoice is a service that falls squarely within the phrase “Internet and other interactive computer services” as defined in sections 230(f)(1) & 230(f)(2), contrary to the claims of some commenters. See Minnesota Independent Coalition Comments at 5 (claiming 230(f) definitions pertain to content services which DigitalVoice does not meet). While we do not decide the classification of DigitalVoice today so as to specify what type of “interactive computer service” it is under section 230(f)(2), that determination is unnecessary for purposes of demonstrating its nexus to section 230. DigitalVoice is unquestionably an “Internet” service as defined in section 230(f)(1), a definition which is not limited to any particular content as we discuss in more detail below.

11647 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2).

117 See Pulver, 19 FCC Rcd at 3319, para. 18 n.66.

118See id. We found Pulver’s FWD service to be an information service – a determination which further supported a national federal regulatory regime for that service. Indeed, were we to reach a similar statutory “information service” classification determination for DigitalVoice in this Order, there would be no question that Congress intended it to remain free from state-imposed economic, public-utility type regulation, consistent with the Commission’s long-standing policy of non-regulation for information services. Seeid. at 3317-22, paras. 17-22. In Pulver, we explained that through codifying the Commission’s decades old distinction between “basic services” and “enhanced services” as “telecommunications services” and “information services,” respectively, in the 1996 Act, and by specifically excluding information services from the ambit of Title II, Congress indicated, consistent with the Commission’s long-standing policy of nonregulation, that information services not be regulated. S ee id. at 3318-19, para. 18; see alsoNon-Accounting Safeguards Order, 11 FCC Rcd at 21955-56, para. 102; IP‑Enabled Services Proceeding, 19 FCC Rcd at 4879-81, 4890-91, paras. 25-27, 39. While Congress has indicated that information services are not subject to the type of regulation inherent in Title II, Congress has provided the Commission with ancillary authority under Title I to impose such regulations as may be necessary to carry out its mandates under the Act. Although the Commission has clear authority to do so, it has only rarely sought to regulate information services using its Title I ancillary authority. See Implementation of Section 255 and 251(a)(2) of the Communications Act of 1934, as Enacted by the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Access to Telecommunications Service, Telecommunications Equipment and Customer Premises Equipment by Persons with Disabilities, WT Docket No. 96-198, Report and Order and Further Notice of Inquiry, 16 FCC Rcd 6417 (1999).

119 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1).

120 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1), (2) (emphasis added). Indeed, the communications that occur when a subscriber uses the DigitalVoice service are Internet communications, no less than e-mail, instant messaging, or chat rooms. See, e.g., VON Coalition Aug. 19 Ex Parte Letter, Attach at 2. Although DigitalVoice may be functionally similar in some respects to voice communications that are not dependent upon the Internet, this does not change the fact that DigitalVoice is an Internet-based communications service. See also supra note 115.

121 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1), (2) (emphasis added).

122 See, e.g., MCI/CompTel Comments at 11; Motorola Comments at 12; SBC Comments at 2-4; VON Coalition Comments at 13; AT&T Reply at 2; Vonage Aug. 13 Ex Parte Letter, Attach. at 3; VON Coalition Aug. 19 Ex Parte Letter, Attach. at 13.

123 See, e.g., California Commission Comments at 15-17; Minnesota Independent Coalition Comments at 4-6; MTA Comments at 6.

124 See 47 U.S.C. § 230.

Vonage Holdings Corporation Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning an Order of the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, WC Docket No. 03-211, Memorandum Opinion and Order (FCC Nov. 12, 2004 )


Finally, the claim that our jurisdiction is preempted because Congress declared that the Internet should be free of regulation misreads the Act. As we stated above, §230 is aimed at the content of speech on the Internet and does not affect states’
application of traditional common carrier regulation.
-- Complaint of Frontier Telephone of Rochester, Inc. Against Vonage Holdings Corporation Concerning Provision of Local Exchange and InterExchange Telephone Service in New York State in Violation of the Public Service Law, CASE 03-C-1285, Order Establishing Balanced Regulatory Framework for Vonage Holding Corporation, p. 11-15 (May 21, 2004)

Sec. 706

We are also guided by section 706 of the 1996 Act, which directs the Commission (and state commissions with jurisdiction over telecommunications services) to encourage the deployment of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans by using measures that “promote competition in the local telecommunications market” and removing “barriers to infrastructure investment.”125 Internet-based services such as DigitalVoice are capable of being accessed only via broadband facilities, i.e., advanced telecommunications capabilities under the 1996 Act,126 thus driving consumer demand for broadband connections, and consequently encouraging more broadband investment and deployment consistent with the goals of section 706.127 Indeed, the Commission’s most recent Fourth Section 706 Report to Congress recognizes the nexus between VoIP services and accomplishing the goals of section 706.128 Thus, precluding multiple disparate attempts to impose economic regulations on DigitalVoice that would thwart its development and potentially result in it exiting the market will advance the goals and objectives of section 706.

125 47 U.S.C. § 157 nt. Section 706 of the 1996 Act is located in the notes of section 7 of the Communication Act. To implement section 706’s mandate, the Commission has considered, among other things, whether its rules promote the delivery of innovative advanced services offerings. See Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, CC Docket Nos. 01-338, 96-98, 98-147, Report and Order and Order on Remand and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd 16978 (2003) (FNPRM), corrected by Errata, 18 FCC Rcd 19020 (2003), aff’d in part, remanded in part, vacated in part, United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004), cert. denied sub nom. Nat’l Ass’n Regulatory. Util. Comm’rs v. United States Telecom Ass’n, 73 USLW 3234 ( U.S. Oct. 12, 2004) (Nos. 04-12, 04-15, 04-18). We find that our actions in this ruling are also consistent with this provision of the Act.

126 See 47 U.S.C. § 157 nt. (c)(1) (defining “advanced telecommunications capability”).

127 See 8x8 Comments at 5; VON Coalition Aug. 19 Ex Parte Letter, Attach at 7-8.

128 See Fourth Section 706 Report at 38 (“[S]ubscribership to broadband services will increase in the future as new applications that require broadband access, such as VoIP, are introduced into the marketplace, and consumers become more aware of such applications.”) (emphasis added); see also id. at 3 (Statement of Chairman Powell) (“Disruptive VoIP services are acting as a demand-driver for broadband connections, lighting the industry’s fuse, and exciting a moribund market.”); APT Comments at 2; Motorola Comments at 12.

Vonage Holdings Corporation Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning an Order of the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, WC Docket No. 03-211, Memorandum Opinion and Order (FCC Nov. 12, 2004 )

Commerce Clause

38. We note that our decision today is fully consistent with the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The Commerce Clause provides that “[t]he Congress shall have Power … [t]o regulate Commerce … among the several States.”130 As explained by the Supreme Court, “[t]hough phrased as a grant of regulatory power to Congress, the Clause has long been understood to have a ‘negative’ aspect that denies the States the power unjustifiably to discriminate against or burden the interstate flow of articles of commerce.”131 Under the Commerce Clause jurisprudence, a state law that “has the ‘practical effect’ of regulating commerce occurring wholly outside that [s]tate’s borders” is a violation of the Commerce Clause.132 In addition, state regulation violates the Commerce Clause if the burdens imposed on interstate commerce by state regulation would be “clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”133 Finally, courts have held that “state regulation of those aspects of commerce that by their unique nature demand cohesive national treatment is offensive to the Commerce Clause.”134

39. Minnesota’s regulation likely has “the ‘practical effect’ of regulating commerce occurring wholly outside that [s]tate’s borders.”135 Because the location of Vonage’s users cannot practically be determined,136 Vonage would likely be required to comply with Minnesota’s regulation for all use of DigitalVoice – including communications that do not originate or terminate in Minnesota, or even involve facilities or equipment in Minnesota – in order to ensure that it could fully comply with the regulations for services in Minnesota. And, as we have explained above, this would likely be the result even if Vonage elected to discontinue seeking subscribers in Minnesota, given that end users could use the service from any broadband connection in Minnesota.137 While states can and should serve as laboratories for different regulatory approaches, we have here a very different situation because of the nature of the service – our federal system does not allow the strictest regulatory predilections of a single state to crowd out the policies of all others for a service that unavoidably reaches all of them. For these reasons, Minnesota’s regulation would likely have the “practical effect” of regulating beyond its borders and therefore would likely violate the Commerce Clause.138

40. In addition, we believe the burdens imposed on interstate commerce by the Minnesota Commission’s regulation would likely be “clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”139 The Minnesota regulation would impose significant burdens on interstate commerce.140 As discussed above, even if it were relevant and possible to track the geographic location of packets and isolate traffic for the purpose of ascertaining jurisdiction over a theoretical intrastate component of an otherwise integrated bit stream, such efforts would be impractical and costly.141 At the same time, we believe that the local benefits of state economic regulation would be limited. In a dynamic market such as the market for Internet-based services, we believe that imposing this substantial burden on Vonage would serve no useful purpose and would almost certainly be significant and negative for the development of new and innovative interstate Internet-based services.

41. Finally, DigitalVoice, like other Internet services, is likely the type of commerce that is of such a “unique nature” that it “demand[s] cohesive national treatment” under the Commerce Clause.142 Because DigitalVoice is not constrained by geographic boundaries and cannot be excluded from any particular state, inconsistent state economic regulation could cripple development of DigitalVoice and services like it. If Vonage’s DigitalVoice service were subject to state regulation, it would have to satisfy the requirements of more than 50 jurisdictions with more than 50 different sets of regulatory obligations.143 As discussed above, because of the unbounded characteristics of the Internet, Vonage would likely be required in practical effect to subject its service to all customers across the country to the regulations imposed by Minnesota . Moreover, state regulation of Internet-based services, such as DigitalVoice, would make them unique among Internet services as the only Internet service to be subject to such state obligations. Indeed, allowing the imposition of state regulation on Vonage would likely eliminate any benefit of using the Internet to provide the service. The Internet enables individuals and small providers to reach a global market simply by attaching a server to the Internet; requiring Vonage to submit to more than 50 different regulatory regimes as soon as it did so would eliminate this fundamental advantage of Internet-based communication. Thus, services, such as DigitalVoice, are likely of a “unique nature” that “demand[s] cohesive national treatment,” and therefore, inconsistent state regulations would likely violate the Commerce Clause.144

130 U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.

131Oregon Waste Sys. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994) (citations omitted); see alsoPSINet, Inc. v. Chapman, 362 F.3d 227, 239 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting General Motors Corp. v. Tracey, 519 U.S. 278, 287 (1997)); American Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 173 (holding that the Internet is an instrument of “interstate commerce” under the Commerce Clause).

132Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324, 332 (1989); see alsoCotto Waxo Co. v. Williams, 46 F.3d 790, 793 (8th Cir. 1995) (“Under the Commerce Clause, a state regulation is per se invalid when it has an ‘extraterritorial reach,’ that is, when the statute has the practical effect of controlling conduct beyond the boundaries of the state. The Commerce Clause precludes application of a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the state’s borders.”) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).

133See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); see alsoCotto Waxo Co. v. Williams, 46 F.3d at 793 (“[I]f the challenged statute regulates evenhandedly, then it burdens interstate commerce indirectly and is subject to a balancing test. Under the balancing test, a state statute violates the Commerce Clause only if the burdens it imposes on interstate commerce are ‘clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.’”) (citation omitted).

134American Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 169 (citing Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886)); see id. at 181 (“The courts have long recognized that certain types of commerce demand consistent treatment and are therefore susceptible to regulation only on a national level.”); American Civil Liberties Union v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1162 (10th Cir. 1999).

135 Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. at 332; see also American Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 173-74, 177; American Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 2003) (acknowledging that because of “the Internet’s boundary-less nature,” regulations of Internet communications may not be “wholly outside” a state’s borders, but nonetheless may impose extraterritorial regulation in violation of the Commerce Clause).

136 See supra para. 5.

137 See supra para. 30.

138 See Vonage Petition at 29 (“Vonage has no way of assuring that it is in compliance with the [Minnesota Vonage Order] unless it blocks a substantial amount of interstate traffic as well.”); id. at 31 (“[S]ince any Vonage customer could, in theory, travel to Minnesota at any time and connect their MTA computer to a broadband Internet connection, Vonage could never prevent all intrastate Minnesota use of its service unless it blocked all interstate ‘calls’ as well.”) (emphasis in original); id. at 25, 27; see also American Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 171 (“[N]o aspect of the Internet can feasibly be closed off to users from another state.”).

139 See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. at 142; see alsoCotto Waxo Co. v. Williams, 46 F.3d at 793. See generally Michael A. Bamberger, The Clash Between the Commerce Clause and State Regulation of the Internet, Internet Newsletter, Apr. 2002 (explaining that “[f]or the most part, courts have analyzed the constitutionality of state Internet regulation under the test employed by the Pike court”) (emphasis added).

140 Indeed, one federal court has already determined, in the specific context of Vonage, that state entry regulation of DigitalVoice would interfere with interstate commerce. See New York Preliminary Injunction at 2; seealsoAmerican Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d at 104 (“We think it likely that the [I]nternet will soon be seen as falling within the class of subjects that are protected from State regulation because they ‘imperatively demand [] a single uniform rule.’”) (citing Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1851)).

141 Seesupra para. 29; see alsoAmerican Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 170 (“The Internet is wholly insensitive to geographic distances. . . . Internet protocols were designed to ignore rather than document geographic location . . . .”).

142 American Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 69 (citing Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557); see alsoAmerican Civil Liberties Union v. Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1162 (“As we observed, . . . certain types of commerce have been recognized as requiring national regulation. . . . The Internet is surely such a medium.”).

143 See alsoAmerican Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 169 (“ The menace of inconsistent state regulation invites analysis under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, because that clause represented the framers' reaction to overreaching by the individual states that might jeopardize the growth of the nation ‑ and in particular, the national infrastructure of communications and trade ‑ as a whole.”) (citing Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992)).

144 Federal court decisions applying the Commerce Clause to state regulation of Internet services have come to similar conclusions. In American Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, a leading case on this issue, a federal district court struck down a New York state statute making it a crime to disseminate indecent material to minors over the Internet. The court held that the New York law violated the Commerce Clause because it (1) overreached by seeking to regulate conduct occurring outside its borders; (2) imposed burdens on interstate commerce that exceeded any local benefit; and (3) subjected interstate use of the Internet to inconsistent regulations. See American Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 183-84. In several subsequent cases, federal courts of appeal expressly adopted these holdings. See PSINet, Inc. v. Chapman, 362 F.3d 227; American Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96; American Civil Liberties Union v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149; see also American Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 182 (“The Internet . . . requires a cohesive national scheme of regulation so that users are reasonably able to determine their obligations.”).

We also note examples from other network-based industries where, although an intrastate component may exist, state authority must nonetheless yield to exclusive federal jurisdiction in the area of economic or other state regulations affecting interstate commerce. For example, in the case of railroads, the Supreme Court struck down a state regulation regarding the length of trains, holding that “examination of all the relevant factors makes it plain that the state interest is outweighed by the interest of the nation in an adequate, economical and efficient railway transportation service, which must prevail.” Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 783-84 (1945). Similarly, in trucking cases, the Supreme Court has invalidated state laws regulating the length of trucks under the Commerce Clause when the regulation imposes a burden on interstate trucking that is not outweighed by the local interest. SeeRaymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978); Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981). In another transportation case, the Court struck down an Illinois law mandating a particular type of mudguards on trucks operating in the state, concluding that the regulation imposed significant burdens on interstate trucking with no countervailing benefits. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959).

Vonage Holdings Corporation Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning an Order of the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, WC Docket No. 03-211, Memorandum Opinion and Order (FCC Nov. 12, 2004 )

Opposed to multiple Jurisdictions Regulation

37. Allowing Minnesota’s order to stand would invite similar imposition of 50 or more additional sets of different economic regulations on DigitalVoice, which could severely inhibit the development of this and similar VoIP services.129 We cannot, and will not, risk eliminating or hampering this innovative advanced service that facilitates additional consumer choice, spurs technological development and growth of broadband infrastructure, and promotes continued development and use of the Internet. To do so would ignore the Act’s express mandates and directives with which we must comply, in contravention of the pro-competitive deregulatory policies the Commission is striving to further.

129See Pulver, 19 FCC Rcd at 3319-20, para. 19; see also American Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. at 183 (“Haphazard and uncoordinated state regulation [of the Internet] can only frustrate the growth of cyberspace.”).

Vonage Holdings Corporation Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning an Order of the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, WC Docket No. 03-211, Memorandum Opinion and Order (FCC Nov. 12, 2004 )


We determine, consistent with our precedent regarding information services, that FWD is an unregulated information service and any state regulations that seek to treat FWD as a telecommunications service or otherwise subject it to public-utility type regulation would almost certainly pose a conflict with our policy of nonregulation.55
-- In re Petition for Declaratory Ruling that pulver.com's Free World Dialup is Neither Telecommunications Nor a Telecommunications Service, WC Docket No. 03-45, Memorandum Opinion And Order ¶ 15 (FCC February 19, 2004)



In the Universal Service Report, the FCC explained that policy considerations required keeping the definition of telecommunications services distinct from information services so that information services would be open to healthy competition. Its discussion demonstrates the FCC's reluctance to permit state regulation of information services providers, foreshadowing the very issue
before the Court today:

An approach in which a broad range of information service providers are simultaneously classed as telecommunications carriers, and thus presumptive ly subject to the broad range of Title II constraints, could seriously curtail the regulatory freedom that the Commission concluded in Computer II was important to the healthy and competitive development of the enhanced-services industry. . . . The classification of information service providers as telecommunications carriers, moreover, could encourage states to impose common-carrier regulation on such providers. . . . State requirements for telecommunications carriers vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but include certification, tariff filing, and various reporting requirements and fees.

Universal Service Report, 13 FCC Rcd. ¶ 46, at 11524. The Court thus concludes that Minnesota regulations that have the effect of regulating information services are in conflict with federal law and must be pre-empted.
- Vonage Holding Company v. Minnesota PUC, Civil No 03-5287, Sec. IV.A. (DMinn Oct 16, 2003)



In my opinion, the nascent VoIP industry should not be subjected to death-by-regulation, which could well occur by having 51 state commissions imposing idiosyncratic, inconsistent, and costly obligations.  I welcome FCC direction as to whether and how VoIP should be regulated.
--In The Matter Of The Investigation Into Voice Over Internet Protocol (Voip) Services, Docket No. 03M-220T, Order Closing Docket ¶ 1 ( Colorado PUC Dec. 17, 2003) (Chairman Gregory E. Sopkin Specially Concurring)

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